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Private property, including intellectual property, is essential to our way
of life. It provides an incentive for investment and innovation; it stimulates
the flourishing of our culture; it protects the moral entitlements of people to
the fruits of their labors. But reducing too much to private property can be
bad medicine. Private land, for instance, is far more useful if separated from
other private land by public streets, roads and highways. Public parks, util-
ity rights-of-way and sewers reduce the amount of land in private hands, but
vastly enhance the value of the property that remains.
So too it is with intellectual property. Overprotecting intellectual prop-
erty is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a
rich public domain. . . . Culture, like science and technology, grows by
accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came before.
Overprotection stfles the very creative forces it's supposed to nurture.
-Judge Kozinski, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.1
INTRODUCTION
In the half century since James Watson and Francis Crick used X-
ray crystallography to solve the double helical structure of DNA,2 the
biotechnology revolution triggered by their discovery has fundamen-
tally transformed modern biology.3 Scientists continue to develop
1 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
2 J. D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A Structure for Deox-
yribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737 (1953); see infta note 145 and accompanying text. Wat-
son and Crick based their work in large part on X-ray diffraction studies by Rosalind
Franklin and Maurice Wilkins. See, e.g., Rosalind E. Franklin & R.G. Gosling, Molecular
Configuration in Sodium Thymonucleate, 171 NATURE 740 (1953); M.H.F. Wilkins et al., Molec-
ular Structure of Deoxypentose Nucleic Acids, 171 NATURE 738 (1953).
3 Greater understanding of the physical mechanisms by which genes and genetic
defects affect human metabolism, growth, and development has enabled medical advances
akin to the development of antibiotics in the first half of the twentieth century. SeeAlessan-
dro Aiuti et al., Gene Therapy for Adenosine Deaminase Deficiency, 3 CURRENT Op. ALLERGY &
CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 461 (2003) (describing treatment of a genetic deficiency in an es-
sential enzyme using gene therapy to insert a working copy of a gene encoding the enzyme
into a patient's genome); Donald A. Berry et al., BRCAPRO Validation, Sensitivity of Genetic
Testing of BRCA1/BRCA2, and Prevalence of Other Breast Cancer Susceptibility Genes, 20 J. CLN-
994 [Vol. 89:993
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new drugs, laboratory methods, and research tools at a staggering
pace. 4 The attendant accumulation of scientific knowledge has at
times outstripped the ability of government agencies responsible for
setting research, technology, and patent policies to assimilate and un-
derstand these new technologies. 5 Consequently, the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH), the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),
and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) have stitched
together an ad hoc collection of policy directives, examination guide-
lines, and case law in an effort to address a variety of economic, ethi-
cal, and practical concerns about the patentability of biotechnological
inventions. 6 Unfortunately, failure to systematically address the ques-
CAL ONCOLOGY 2701 (2002) (demonstrating the utility of mutations in the BRCA1/BRCA2
genes as indicators of susceptibility to heritable forms of breast and ovarian cancer). As
biotechnology companies continue to sprout up around large research universities, con-
ventional pharmaceutical companies have radically altered their approach to research and
drug development. See generally NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
RESEARCH TooLs IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP HELD AT THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, FEBRUARY 15-16, 1996, at 50 (1997), available at http://
books.nap.edu/books/0309057485/html/50.html [hereinafter WORKSHOP SUMMARY]
(describing the research strategy of the biotechnology industry); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cu-
mulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 813-18 (2001) (describing the dramatic increase in research part-
nerships between biotechnology "start-ups" and established pharmaceutical companies to
develop novel drugs from proteins or nucleic acids to treat a variety of disorders, in con-
trast to the traditional "big-pharma" approach of developing small molecule drug therapies
from existing drugs to treat relatively few diseases); John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research
Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY 285, 289 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
4 These tools include, among other things, recombinant DNA technology, see Stanley
N. Cohen et al., Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids In Vitro, 70 PROC.
NAT'L ACAD. ScI. USA 3240 (1973), monoclonal antibodies, see G. K6hler & C. Milstein,
Continuous Cultures of Fused Cells Secreting Antibody of Predefined Specificity, 256 NATURE 495
(1975), the polymerase chain reaction, see Kary B. Mullis & Fred A. Faloona, Specific Synthe-
sis of DNA in Vitro via a Polymerase-Catalyzed Chain Reaction, 155 METHODS ENZYMOLOGY 335
(Ray Wu ed., 1987); Randall K. Saiki et al., Primer-Directed Enzymatic Amplification of DNA with
a Thermostable DNA Polymerase, 239 Sci. 487 (1988), and DNA micro-arrays, see Mark Schena
et al., Quantitative Monitoring of Gene Expression Patterns with a Complementary DNA Microarray,
270 Sci. 467 (1995).
5 See Kojo Yelpaala, Owning the Secret of Life: Biotechnology and Property Rights Revisited,
32 McGEORGE L. REv. 111, 188 (2000) ("[A] system designed for mechanical devices would
be most unsuited to the new era of inventions and discoveries involving new life forms,
living organisms, gene sequences, intra-species, and transgenic cloning of living organisms
including human beings. The fundamental policy issues ... challenge the core premises
of the patent system itself."); S. Benjamin Pleune, Note, Trouble with the Guidelines: On Urg-
ing the PTO To Properly Evolve With Novel Technologies, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 365, 365-67
(2001) (discussing difficulties that the PTO encountered in evaluating new technologies
according to statutory requirements designed for different purposes).
6 See, e.g., Kevin C. Hooper, Utility and Non-Operability Standards in Biotechnology Patent
Prosecution: CAFC Precedent Versus PTO Practice, 36 IDEA 203, 210-39 (1996) (comparing the
approaches of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the PTO toward assessing
utility and nonoperability in biotechnology patent prosecution); Daniel J. Kevles & Ari
Berkowitz, The Gene Patenting Controversy: A Convergence of Law, Economic Interests, and Ethics,
67 BROOK. L. REV. 233, 245-48 (2001) (discussing the controversy over new gene patents,
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tions raised by the application of conventional patent law doctrine to
the new field of biotechnology has further confused the issues.7
The American patent system seeks to promote scientific progress
and technological development by providing financial incentives to
inventors and entrepreneurs.8 It strikes the "patent bargain" with in-
ventors, giving them a private right (exclusive ownership of their in-
ventions for twenty years) in exchange for a public good (full
disclosure of their discoveries via publication of patent applications
within one year of filing).9 Granting exclusive rights to inventors ad-
dresses the problems inherent in the public goods nature of many
inventions, which are often expensive to produce but easy to appropri-
ate.10 Although the patent monopoly allows inventors to restrict out-
put and increase prices, the public ultimately benefits from the utility
of inventions that might not have been produced otherwise. 1"
For many years, American patent policy has assumed that compa-
nies in "high technology" industries require the financial incentive
provided by a comprehensive system of intellectual property protec-
including ethical objections and the economic interests at stake); Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov,
Comment, A Higher Nonobviousness Standard for Gene Patents: Protecting Biomedical Research
from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 143, 144 (2000) (suggesting that a height-
ened standard of nonobviousness be applied to new gene patents to ensure that other
researchers have ready access to potential research tools); Matthew D. Kellam, Note, Mak-
ing Sense out of Antisense: The Enablement Requirement in Biotechnology After Enzo Biochem v.
Calgene, 76 IND. L.J. 221, 238-41 (2001) (analyzing the requirement that an inventor pro-
vide a full and enabling disclosure with a patent application in light of the Federal Circuit's
holding in Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
7 Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue that conventional, "one-size-fits-all" patent stat-
utes designed "to meet the simpler needs of an industrial era" simply cannot accommodate
the variety and complexity of new technologies. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent
Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1155 (2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted). They suggest instead that the patent statutes be applied in a technology-
specific way to reflect differences between various technologies, such as computer pro-
gramming and biotechnology. See id. at 1157; see also Sara B. Blanchard, Comment, The
Muddled Law of Biotechnology: Frustrating Agricultural and Biomedical Progress, 5 SAN JOAQUIN
AGRIC. L. REV. 179, 180 (1995) (arguing that biotechnology quickly outgrew the existing
patent system and attempts to update the patent laws produced "a fickle and inadequate
structure of protection"); Pleune, supra note 5, at 365 (arguing that the PTO's attempts to
keep up with changes in biotechnology have produced only "confusing court decisions
and ineffective PTO guidelines").
8 See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 12-13 (2d ed. 2001); Ro.-
ERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 126-27 (2d
ed. 2000).
9 David B. Resnik, A Biotechnology Patent Pool. An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 3J. PHIL.,
Sci. & L. 1 (2003), at http://www.psljournal.com/archives/papers/biotechPatent.cfm.
10 Creative activities often suffer from the "public goods" problem: they tend to be
"costly to produce but.., virtually costless to reproduce or to appropriate once they have
been created." Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1158. By granting the creator legal rights
over the products of creative activity, the patent system allows inventors to profit from the
goods they produce. See id.
I I See Resnik, supra note 9, at 1.
996
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tion to invest in risky, expensive research and product development.12
The little available empirical evidence does not clearly support this
assumption.1 3 Nevertheless, the policy persists despite the fact that
the federally funded research enterprise successfully operated as a
common resource for the public good for most of the twentieth cen-
tury.14 Under the "commons" model, the federal government spon-
sored basic research and encouraged its widespread publication in the
public domain without regard for potential commercial applica-
tions. 15 Not until passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 198016 were scien-
tists allowed to retain patent rights to inventions created with federal
research funding.1 7 Since then, however, researchers and biotechnol-
ogy companies have patented countless useful research methods and
materials.' 8 As the number of such patents increases, so too will the
costs of subsequent experimentation, first because all researchers
wishing to use patented research tools must first obtain a license, and
secondly because patent licensing agreements frequently contain pro-
visions restricting permissible uses of the proprietary technology.' 9
12 The "high technology" sector encompasses the computer, semiconductor, and
pharmaceutical industries, among others. Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The
Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL'v
273, 274 (1998). Some evidence suggests that the pharmaceutical industry may, more than
others, require exclusive patent rights in order to invest in research and development. See
id. at 276. See generally id. at 274-80 (discussing theories advanced in support of the pro-
position that strong patent protection provides incentives essential to promote innovation
and reporting that "knowledgeable economists" have concluded that patent protection is
not an important part of the incentives driving research and development in most
industries).
13 See, e.g., id. But see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philos-
ophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the con-
viction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'"
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
14 Compare Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968) (arguing
that unrestricted sharing of limited resources results in overutilization and depletion), with
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 Sc.i. 698, 698 (1998) (stating that scarce resources are prone to
underutilization "when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from" using
them).
15 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698.
16 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12
(2000)).
17 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1689-92 (1996) [hereinafter
Eisenberg, Government-Sponsored Research]; see also infra notes 101-15 and accompanying
text (discussing the Bayh-Dole Act in more detail).
18 Walsh et al., supra note 3, at 296.
19 See Resnik, supra note 9, at 1. Examples of these restrictions include: (1) the patent
holder's right to review manuscripts before publication; (2) delays in the publication of
research results so that patent applications may be filed; (3) the patent holder's "legal
claims to ownership of future scientific discoveries"; (4) "the right to refuse to license"
downstream discoveries ("follow-on" innovation) to other researchers; and (5) the right to
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The higher transaction costs may in turn prevent researchers from
making new discoveries or commercializing new technologies.20
Enforcing property rights in scientific discoveries to the exclusion
of other researchers conflicts with traditional scientific norms.21 Aca-
demic scientists typically expect that data, research tools, and other
scholarly resources will be widely shared and openly examined by the
scientific community.22 In fact, for much of the twentieth century,
scientists rarely sought protection for their inventions. 23 After Con-
gress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, the debate over the costs and benefits
of intellectual property protection intensified. Advocates of strong
patent protection 24 applauded the resulting rise in patent applications
prevent licensees from sharing research materials and methods with competing research-
ers. David Bollier, The Enclosure of the Academic Commons, 88 ACADEME 18, 20 (2002); see
Eugene Russo, Regulating Researchers' "Picks and Shovels": Scientists Continue To Review NIH
Research Tool Guidelines, 14 SCIENTIST 8, 8 (2000); Ian R. Walpole et al., Human Gene Patents:
The Possible Impacts on Genetic Services Healthcare, 179 MED. J. AUSTL. 203, 203-04 (2003),
available at http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/179_04_180803/wall0811_fm.pdf (cit-
ing the breast cancer gene as an example of the restrictive provisions placed on patent
licensing agreements).
20 See Resnik, supra note 9, at 1.
21 See ROBERT K. MERTON, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCI-
ENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 267, 273 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973);
see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Re-
search, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 177 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Biotechnology Research] (evaluat-
ing the contention that "commercial incentives [that liberal patent policies provide] will
weaken or ... undermine the norms that have traditionally governed scientific research");
Michele Svatos, Biotechnology and the Utilitarian Argument for Patents, in SCIENTIFIC INNOVA-
TION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 113, 117-18 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1996)
(suggesting that the utilitarian arguments advanced in favor of granting strong patent pro-
tection to biotechnological inventions have not been carefully examined and noting that
patent holders are not obligated to license their patents to competitors).
22 See, e.g., MERTON, supra note 21, at 273; Bollier, supra note 19, at 1. Free access to
prior discoveries allows scientists to scrutinize their peers' research (thereby guarding
against fraud and error) and to use previous findings in subsequent research (thereby
promoting scientific progress). See, e.g., MERTON, supra note 21, at 270. The latter is partic-
ularly important given the cumulative nature of biotechnology research, in which new dis-
coveries build upon previous work. See id.; Walsh et al., supra note 3, at 289-90.
23 Bollier, supra note 19, at 1. For example, neither Jonas Salk nor Cesar Milstein
patented their work, despite its enormous commercial potential. Id. Salk pioneered re-
search that led to the first polio vaccine. Id. Milstein "shared a Nobel Prize for helping
develop monoclonal antibody technology in 1975." Id Nor did Stanley Cohen and Her-
bert Boyer, co-inventors of recombinant DNA technology, consider filing a patent applica-
tion until an attorney for Stanford University suggested that they do so. Id. Cohen's initial
reaction to the suggestion that his work be patented "was to question whether basic re-
search of this type could or should be patented and to point out that our work had been
dependent on a number of earlier discoveries by others." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). "Cohen later agreed to file for a patent, but only" on the condition that Stan-
ford be named the exclusive beneficiary. Id. According to Robert Merton, "[t]he substan-
tive findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are assigned to the
community .... [so a] scientist's claim to 'his' intellectual 'property' is limited to that of
recognition and esteem .... " MERTON, supra note 21, at 273.
24 This Note uses the term "strong patent protection" to refer to the two most impor-
tant factors favoring patent holders upon a challenge to patent validity: the broad scope
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and private investment in research and development. 25 Opponents
charged that the increased propensity to patent would raise research
costs and stifle potentially lifesaving innovations in the course of
downstream research and product development. 26 These conflicting
positions echo the essential dilemma at the core of American patent
policy: how to balance the need for unfettered access to scientific in-
formation and essential research tools with the desire to provide suffi-
cient economic incentives to fuel scientific innovation. 27 By passing
legislation that encourages inventors to patent government-sponsored
inventions, Congress may have too quickly abandoned the successful
"commons" approach to publicly funded research. 28 Granting exclu-
sive patent rights in government-funded discoveries frequently under-
mines incentives to develop and market products based upon new
technologies. 29 Indeed, strong patent protection may in some cases
actually impede scientific progress. 30
This Note argues that a broad experimental use exception to the
otherwise exclusive patent grant may diminish the problems caused by
patenting research tools in biotechnology: namely, greater research
common to biotechnology patents and the CAFC's strongly pro-patent stance. See ROBERT
L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1136 (5th ed. 2001); Edward T. Lentz,
Adequacy of Disclosures of Biotechnology Inventions, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N 314, 318
(1998-99).
25 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698; see also ANDREW J. HACKING, ECONOMIC
ASPECTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 43 (1986) (claiming that patents are an "indispensable ele-
ment" in biotechnology).
26 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698; see also Eliot Marshall, A Deluge of
Patents Creates Legal Hassles for Research, 288 Sci. 255, 255-56 (2000) (explaining how pat-
enting transgenic mice has slowed down progress in some areas of molecular genetics).
27 In the words of Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisenberg, "[t]he challenge lies in distin-
guishing discoveries that are better developed and disseminated through open access from
discoveries that are better developed and disseminated under the protection of intellectual
property rights." Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291 (2003); see alsoJohn M. Golden, Biotech-
nology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American Sys-
tem, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 107-08 (2001) (asking whether patent law can achieve an "ideal
balance between the incentives for invention and dissemination"); Sheldon Krimsky, The
Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative Implications, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 15, 26-28
(1999) (discussing the scientific and social consequences of commodifying scientific
knowledge and stating that patent policy must balance the notion that biological and ge-
netic information "is part of the common human heritage" with the fact that such "knowl-
edge . .. possess[es] economic value that should be realized"); Margaret Sampson, The
Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements Under 35 U.S. C. § 112 in the
Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1234 (2000) (arguing that the CAFC and
the PTO must balance "the interests of inventors and scientists to create an environment
that encourages innovation by adequately protecting inventions without granting overly
broad patent rights").
28 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the Genome Project: Problems with
Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK 163, 165-66 (1994) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Patenting
Problems].
29 See id.
30 See id.
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costs, misallocation of limited resources, duplication of effort, and
diminution in follow-on innovation. Part I describes the nature of the
patent grant, surveys the origin and evolution of the American patent
system, and discusses the allocation of patent rights to inventions re-
sulting from federally funded research. Part II explains the concepts
and methods underpinning modern biotechnology and goes on to de-
scribe what constitutes patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Part III explores the economics of innovation and the impact
of strong patent protection on downstream applications of new tech-
nology. Finally, Part IV analyzes several proposed modifications to the
existing patent system and concludes that an expansive experimental
use exemption from patent infringement for noncommercial research
offers the most promising antidote to problems associated with the
propertization of biotechnology.
I
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN
PATENT SYSTEM
A. Nature of the Patent Grant
A patent confers upon an inventor "the right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention"
claimed in the patent application for a period of twenty years.3 1 Any-
one may apply for a patent, regardless of "age, nationality, mental
competency, incarceration, or any other characteristic," provided that
he or she is the true inventor of the device in question. 32 "A patent is
a form of personal property" and as such is fully alienable. 33 Accord-
ingly, a patent owner may sell it outright or may give another person
permission to use the invention in exchange for royalty payments. 34
There are three types of patents: utility, design, and plant.3 5 Util-
ity patents cover inventions that function in a novel way to produce a
useful result.3 6 They include Velcro fasteners, automatic transmis-
sions, and virtually "anything under the sun that is made by man."37
Design patents encompass "the unique, ornamental, or visible shape
31 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), (2) (2000); see DAVID PRESSMAN, PATENT IT YOURSELF 1/3
(9th ed. 2002).
32 See PRESSMAN, supra note 31, at 1/3. Interestingly, neither death nor insanity pro-
vides an obstacle to obtaining a patent; deceased or mentally infirm inventors may apply
for a patent through a personal representative. Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. Such licensing agreements are increasingly common in biotechnology-related
research. Id.
35 See id. at 1/3-1/5.
36 Id. at 1/3.
37 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting the Committee Re-
ports accompanying the Patent Act of 1952, S. REP. No. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No.
1923, at 6 (1952)).
1000 [Vol. 89:993
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or design" of a manmade object.3 18 A design patent will be issued pro-
vided that the unique shape or design of an object is purely ornamen-
tal or aesthetic.39 If the unique feature serves a functional purpose,
however, the inventor should file a utility patent instead.40 Federal
law also allows inventors to patent plants.
41
The patent monopoly extends for twenty years from the date of
filing, but the inventor has no right to enforce his monopoly before
then. 42 The PTO may extend the statutory period when regulatory
review delays commercial marketing of the product.43
B. Early History
The nascent U.S. federal government initially modeled the Amer-
ican system of patent protection after that of England.44 The English
system consisted of "a largely informal administrative apparatus' 45
that evaluated applications describing new inventions and granted
successful inventors a fourteen-year monopoly on the manufacture,
sale, and use of their invention. 46 The English government intended
to encourage technological innovation by granting inventors exclusive
rights in their creations. 47 This approach replaced an older system
38 PRESSMAN, supra note 31, at 1/4.
39 Id.
40 Id, Design and utility patents may be distinguished by asking whether eliminating
the unique features of a particular object will substantially impair its intended function. Id.
If so, then filing a utility patent is proper; if not, then filing a design patent will suffice. Id.
41 See 7 U.S.C. § 2321 (2000); PRESSMAN, supra note 31, at 1/4. Plant patents generally
encompass plants reproduced asexually, through grafts or cuttings. See PRESSMAN, supra
note 31, at 1/4. In addition, the Plant Variety Protection Act regulates patents regarding
sexually reproduced plants. Id. Both types of plants may now be the subject of utility
patent applications as well. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
42 See PRESSMAN, supra note 31, at 1/7. The duration of the pendency period from
filing a patent application to allowance of a patent has increased steadily since passage of
the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. See generally U.S. PAT.& TRADEMARK OFF., CENTURY OF AMERICAN
INVEN'TION: A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW, FISCAL YEAR 1999, available at bttp://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/1999/99tbsl-1O.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2004)
[hereinafter PTO SUMMARY, FY 1999] (collecting a wide range of data on filed patent appli-
cations and allowed patents for fiscal year 1999). If and when the patent issues, the inven-
tor obtains the legal right to stop any infringement that began during the pendency
period. See PRESSMAN, supra note 31, at 1/7.
43 See PRESSMAN, supra note 31, at 1/7. Examples of such products include new drugs,
medications, and food additives. Id.
44 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 15; MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 126-28.
45 MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 126.
46 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 14. With the advent of the Industrial Revolution
and the accompanying advances in manufacturing technology, however, requirements for
obtaining a patent grant became increasingly stringent. In particular, an applicant was
required to "describe his... invention clearly and completely," foreshadowing the written
description and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). MERGES ET AL., Supra
note 8, at 126.
47 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 12-13.
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that had gradually become a mechanism for dispensing royal largesse
to favored courtiers. 48
Some of the original thirteen colonies granted patents, beginning
with the first recorded in Massachusetts in 164149 for a method of
producing salt used by the fishing industry.50 Massachusetts, Connect-
icut, and South Carolina were the most active colonies in granting
patents. 51 New York, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Virginia together
issued a total of ten, while Delaware, Georgia, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, and North Carolina issued no patents during the Colonial
era.52 Boycotts of English goods during the Revolutionary War, cou-
pled with colonial notions of self-sufficiency, stimulated industrial de-
velopment both during and after the war. 53 Under the Articles of
Confederation, states retained the power to issue patents after the
war.54 But industrialization sparked a series of patent conflicts be-
tween inventors from different states, and the growing frequency of
such conflicts hastened calls for establishment of a uniform national
patent system. 55
Government officials rarely questioned the utility of a nationwide
patent system because patent disputes affected technologies essential
to the American economy. 56 In fact, James Madison suggested that
the power to grant patents be vested in the federal government be-
cause "[t]he right to useful inventions . . . [should] belong to the
inventors."57 Similar sentiments prompted participants in the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1787 to include the power to grant patents in
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.58 The Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution thus granted Congress the power " [t] o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
48 See id. at 13; MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 125-27.
49 See CHISuM ET AL., supra note 8, at 15; MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 127.
50 See BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAw 60 (1967).
51 See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Ante-
cedents (5 Part I), 78J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 615, 630-31 (1996).
52 Id.
53 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 15-16; MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 126-27.
54 See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: American Patent Law
and Administration, 1787-1836 (Part I), 79J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 61, 66 (1997).
55 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 16; MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 127.
56 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 16-18. Affected technologies included devices
for calculating longitude and engines designed to propel boats with steam. See Edward C.
Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: The Creation of the Patent Act of 1790, 25 AM. INTELL.
PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 445, 459-60 (1997) (quoting THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS PROJECT, 3
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, MARCH 4, 1789-MARCH 3, 1791, at 49, 59-60 (Linda Grant DePauw et al. eds.,
1977-1995)).
57 THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
58 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Writings and Discoveries." 59 Clearly, Congress hoped that the "pro-
ductive effort thereby fostered [would] have a positive effect on soci-
ety through the introduction of new products and processes of
manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of in-
creased employment and better lives for our citizens."60
C. From the Patent Board to the PTO: Evolution of the
Patent Act
Congress adopted the first American patent statute in 1790.61
The legislation fashioned an informal registration procedure in which
a patent board composed of three government officials reviewed every
patent application filed.62 In the Patent Act of 1793, a less cumber-
some clerical registration requirement replaced review by the patent
board,63 and the patent system remained largely pro forma until Con-
gress revised it again with the Patent Act of 1836.64 Because lack of a
formal examination requirement encouraged inventors to file fraudu-
lent or duplicative patents, the 1836 Act implemented a formal review
system, in which professional patent examiners evaluated each appli-
cation for novelty and utility.65 The next legislative revision of the
Patent Act passed in 1870 but retained all the key provisions of the
1836 Act. 66 Since then, Congress has periodically amended the Patent
Act to address issues raised by the development of new technologies. 67
In addition, the PTO frequently develops new rules to accommo-
date novel technologies68 or to limit the number of patents being
59 Id.
60 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)).
61 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 128.
62 See id. "(A] significant contributor to the original statute" was Thomas Jefferson,
then serving as Secretary of State. Id. The first American patent was granted shortly there-
after, covering a process for manufacturing potash from wood ashes. Id.
63 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 19.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 20.
66 Id. at 21.
67 Congress passed a significant revision to the Patent Act in 1952. Id. at 21.
68 See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Require-
ment to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615 passim (1998) (discussing the
evolution of CAFC jurisprudence regarding the written description requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112); Sampson, supra note 27, at 1265-71 (discussing the "Revised Interim Guide-
lines for the Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. § 112(1) 'Written
Description' Requirement" that the PTO issued in December 1999); Timothy A. Worrall,
The 2001 PTO Utility Examination Guidelines and DNA Patents, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 123,
123-24 (2001) (internal footnotes omitted) (stating that because "the PTO [initially]
granted proprietary rights to biotechnology too liberally," it repeatedly revised the Utility
Examination Guidelines, "promulgat[ing] Interim Utility Guidelines in December 1999
and January 2000, and then final Utility Guidelines in January 2001").
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issued. 69 These changes in the federal government's approach to pat-
ent protection were adopted in response to three movements that to-
gether significantly influenced the pace of technological progress in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
1. The Industrial Revolution
The Industrial Revolution dramatically increased the scale of in-
dustrial research and development throughout the United States. 70
With the issuance of patents for a variety of important technologies-
including the incandescent light bulb, the telephone, early automo-
bile designs, and the first airplanes-patents became a significant
measure of economic productivity. 7 1 This change heralded a trend
toward greater patent protection that lasted until the 1920s and
1930s, 72 when a series of abuses committed by large companies in sev-
eral different industries made courts more reluctant to enforce patent
rights. 73 The abuses invariably involved the formation of "patent
pools" among competing manufacturers.7 4 A patent pool is a private
contractual agreement in which the contracting parties transfer their
patent rights into a common company "for the purpose of jointly li-
censing their patent portfolios. '75 The pool consolidates formerly
competing patent rights into a single entity and allows the company
formed by the joint venture to license rights "to the portfolio of
pooled rights, often as a single package." 76
During the 1930s and early 1940s, federal courts greatly weak-
ened the protections conferred by an issued patent, citing a variety of
social costs incurred by the grant of limited monopolies. 77 The Su-
preme Court upheld a number of early cases involving large cross-
69 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 128. For example, the "inventive step" require-
ment now codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) originated in the mid-nineteenth century
as a means to limit the number of issued patents. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11
How.) 248, 266 (1850).
70 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 129 (citing THOMAS P. HUGHES, AMERICAN GENE-
sIs: A CENTURY OF INVENTION AND TECHNOLOGICAL ENTHUSIASM 1870-1970, at 150-80
(1989)).
71 Id.
72 See id.
73 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 21; MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 129.
74 See Steven P. Reynolds, Antitrust and Patent Licensing: Cycles of Enforcement and Current
Policy, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 129, 133-34 (1997) (describing the trend toward use of patent
pools and cross-licensing after passage of the Sherman Act early in the twentieth century);
Steven C. Carlson, Note, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359,
367-72 (1999) (offering examples of patent pools and cross-licensing agreements).
75 Carlson, supra note 74, at 367.
76 Id. at 368.
77 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 21; MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 129.
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licensing agreements7 8 but overturned several others on the grounds
that they imposed an unreasonable restraint on interstate com-
merce.79 In general, the Court proved reluctant to enforce patent
rights based upon such agreements.80 Given the immense contribu-
tions of American inventors during World War II, however, the fed-
eral government once again came to view technological innovation as
an important catalyst for economic growth and progress. 81
2. The War Effort
Following World War II, "there was broad consensus" that the
fruits of federally funded research should remain in the public do-
main or be subject only to nonexclusive licenses. 82 Only then, the
argument ran, could Americans reap the full value of "their collective
investment[ ]" in research and development. 83 Methods and research
tools invented with federal funding were rarely patented; instead,
most were published in the scientific literature. 84 As a result, they
were freely used or incorporated into commercial products or
processes. 85 The extraordinary levels of federal spending on research
and development in support of the war effort yielded remarkable ad-
78 For example, the Supreme Court upheld an agreement organized by the Standard
Oil Company that covered a process for "cracking" petroleum. See Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 283 U.S. 163, 178-79 (1931).
79 For example, the Supreme Court dismantled a glass manufacturing cartel created
by successive patent pooling and cross-licensing agreements among all major glassware
manufacturers. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 386, 392, 432
(1945). During the first half of the twentieth century, the two main glassblowing tech-
niques were the suction method and the suspended gob-feeding method. Id. at 393-94.
Owens-Illinois Glass Co. (which controlled patents covering the suction method) and Hart-
ford-Empire Co. (which controlled patents covering the suspended gob-feeding method)
first cross-licensed their patent portfolios. See id. at 395. After the cartel acquired these
two dominant patents, it obtained rights to virtually all patents covering the commercial
manufacture of glass. At its peak, the cartel controlled more than 600 patents, and ninety-
four percent of all glass manufactured in the United States was produced under license
from Hartford-Empire. See id. at 400. In finding the cartel's activities anticompetitive, Jus-
tice Black asserted that "this country [had] perhaps never witnessed a more completely
successful economic tyranny over any field of industry than that accomplished by these
appellants." Id. at 436-37 (Black, J., dissenting in part); see Carlson, supra note 74, at
374-75 (citing FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM: LEGAL AND Eco-
NOMIC CONFLICTS IN AMERICAN PATENT HISTORY 78-84 (1956)).
80 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 21; MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 130.
81 See Reynolds, supra note 74, at 138 n.63.
82 Bollier, supra note 19, at 2.
83 Id.
84 See Steve L. Bertha, Intellectual Property Activities in U.S. Research Universities, 36 IDEA
513, 514 (1996). The commons approach assumes that the unrestricted availability of re-
search tools does not diminish the incentive to conduct research that produces such inven-
tions in the first place.
85 See id. at 514.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
vances in a wide range of technologies.8 6 The number and variety of
new commercial applications "focused the attention of the federal
government on the issue" of patent policy.8 7 Congress then began to
address the question of who should retain title and the right to exploit
technology resulting from government-sponsored research.8 8
Supporters of government-funded research argued that title to
patents covering such inventions should vest in the federal govern-
ment. 9 According to this argument, leaving patent rights to govern-
ment contractors would concentrate market power in a handful of
large corporations and enable the contractors to eliminate smaller
competitors, to the detriment of both consumers and society.90 Advo-
cates of privately funded research countered that title to these patents
should vest in the inventors.9 ' Otherwise, the firms best able to trans-
fer new technologies from the lab to the market would not accept
public research funds because they would not retain title to patents on
any resulting inventions. 9 2 After a variety of conflicting reports com-
missioned between 1945 and 1965, the government finally concluded
that granting inventors exclusive rights to inventions produced with
federal funds would better promote commercial use of new
technologies. 93
3. Government Intervention
Congress strengthened the protection available to inventors in
the 1952 Patent Act, the first major revision of the patent statutes
since 1870. 94 The 1952 Act remains largely unchanged in the more
than fifty years since its passage. 9 5 Congress twice passed related stat-
86 See Eisenberg, Government-Sponsored Research, supra note 17, at 1671. Advances in
mass production techniques, metallurgy, weapons, and aviation technology helped propel
the Allies to victory. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 129.
87 Eisenberg, Government-Sponsored Research, supra note 17, at 1671.
88 Id.
89 See id. at 1671-73.
90 See id.
91 See id. at 1673-74.
92 See id.
93 See, e.g., NAT'L PAT. PLAN. COMM'N, GOVERNMENT-OWNED PATENTS AND INVENTIONS
OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS 14 (1945) (suggesting that the government
make patents "available for commercial and industrial exploitation by anyone" and arguing
that the government "should ... grant exclusive licenses" only when "necessary to assure
the commercial development of an invention"); U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., 1 INVESTIGATION OF
GOVERNMENT PATENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT 2-8 (1947) (advocating adoption of a uniform federal
patent policy and arguing that only by retaining title to inventions made at public expense
can the government ensure that the public will benefit).
94 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (2000); MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at
129; see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 21-22; Stephen McKenna, Comment, Patentable
Discovey, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1241, 1248 (1996).
95 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 21-22; MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 128-30.
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utes following the 1978 Domestic Policy Review on Industrial Innova-
tion, an initative that President Carter commissioned in an effort to
increase "industrial productivity and innovation."96 The policy review
"recommended that commercial rights to government-supported re-
search be transferred to the private sector."97 Congress implemented
that recommendation in 1980 by passing the Bayh-Dole Act 98 and the
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act. 99 Both Acts sought to
stimulate the commercial development of inventions100 resulting from
federally funded research t01
a. The Bayh-Dole Act and the Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation Act
The Bayh-Dole Act reflected a renewed governmental commit-
ment to encouraging technological innovation, 102 addressing wide-
spread "concern that American industry was losing its technological
edge over foreign competitors. " 10 3 The Act allowed small entities10 4
"(1) [to] retain title to the inventions they created while working on a
government-sponsored program, (2) [to] apply for and receive pat-
ents on those inventions, and (3) [to] pursue options to commercial-
96 Eisenberg, Government-Sponsored Research, supra note 17, at 1689-90. The Carter ini-
tiative was prompted by a study that the Committee on Government Patent Policy had
commissioned to determine (1) the effects of federal patent policy on industry participa-
tion in government-sponsored research and (2) the frequency with which the resulting
inventions were successfully commercialized. Id. at 1679-80. The study demonstrated that
only 12.4% of government-sponsored inventions patented between 1957 and 1962 had
been put to commercial use, id. at 1680 (quoting 4 HAPBRIDGE HOUSE, Government Patent
Policy Study: Final Report ii, 3-4 (1968) [hereinafter HARBRIDGE HOUSE REPORT]), and indi-
cated that granting inventors exclusive rights to their inventions would most effectively
promote commercial utilization of new technologies, particularly for inventions with obvi-
ous commercial applications that required significant additional research and develop-
ment to get a product to market. Id. at 1681-82 (quoting 1 HARBRIDGE HOUSE REPORT,
supra, at vii).
97 4 HARBRIDGE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 96, at 1689.
98 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12
(2000)).
99 Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-15
(2000)).
100 For purposes of these Acts, an "invention" is "any... discovery which is or may be
patentable or otherwise protectable under this title," and an invention resulting from fed-
erally funded research is one "conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the per-
formance of work under a [government] funding agreement." 35 U.S.C. § 201(d), (e).
101 See H.R. REP. No. 96-1199, at 7-8 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4892,
4896-98.
102 See David C. Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities:
An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 REs. POL'Y 99, 103 (2001).
103 Jack E. Kerrigan & ChristopherJ. Brasco, The Technology Transfer Revolution: Legisla-
tive History and Future Proposals, 31 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 277, 279-80 (2002).
104 For purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act, small entities are "businesses employing less
than 500 employees, non-profit organizations, and universities." Mary Eberle, Comment,
March-In Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act: Public Access to Federally Funded Research, 3 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 155, 155 (1999).
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ize those discoveries." 10 5 Thus, universities and small businesses who
accepted federal funding could retain patent rights to their inventions
and license them to companies interested in performing additional
research or willing to develop commercial applications of the novel
technology. 10 6 In the presumably infrequent cases in which "a licen-
see fail [ed] . . . to commercialize [a] technology," the Act allowed a
third party to petition the government for the right to license it for
commercial purposes. 10 7 Legislators included this "march-in" provi-
sion primarily to address situations in which an original licensee was
unable to meet a pressing public health care need. 08 Unsurprisingly,
the federal government has never exercised its "march-in" rights.10 9
The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act addressed
Congress's concern that continuing to isolate federal research facili-
ties from the private sector would impede U.S. leadership in techno-
logical innovation and long-term economic competitiveness.' 10 This
Act enabled federal research laboratories to transfer technology devel-
oped in-house to a nongovernmental entity, such as a university or
biotechnology company. 1  By allowing inventors to patent inventions
105 Diane M. Sidebottom, Updating the Bayh-Dole Act: Keeping the Federal Government on the
Cutting Edge, 30 PUB. CoT'r. L.J. 225, 227-28 (2001) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 206 (2000)).
106 See Eberle, supra note 104, at 155-56.
107 Id. at 156; seeJohns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Johns Hopkins University sued CellPro alleging that CellPro had willfully infringed a uni-
versity researcher's patent on an antibody used in purifying hemapoietic stem cells from
bone marrow. See CellPro, 152 F.3d at 1346-47. The patent was licensed to Becton Dickin-
son and Co. and sublicensed to Baxter Healthcare Corp. Id. at 1346. CellPro denied in-
fringement and argued that the patent at issue was invalid and unenforceable. Id. at 1348.
The court held that CellPro had infringed the patent as a matter of law and granted a new
trial. See id. at 1368; see also Peter Mikhail, Note, Hopkins v. CellPro: An Illustration That
Patenting and Exclusive Licensing of Fundamental Science Is Not Always in the Public Interest, 13
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 375, 386-87 (2000) (discussing the CellPro case in detail).
108 See 35 U.S.C. § 203(b) (2000).
109 Gregg S. Sharp, A Layman's Guide to Intellectual Property in Defense Contracts, 33 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 99, 118 (2003) ("In fact, the Government has never exercised its 'march-in'
rights, but there have been a few close calls.").
1 10 Linda A. Mabry, Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy: Rethinking the
Concept of Corporate Nationality, 87 GEo. L.J. 563, 637 (1999) ("The statute's principal goal is
to eliminate the isolation of government laboratories from universities and industry, a fac-
tor long identified as a major obstacle to technological innovation in the United States.").
Congress regarded the Act "as an important first step in creating a comprehensive national
policy ... to enhance technological innovation for commercial and public purposes." Id.
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III See Sidebottom, supra note 105, at 227. The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innova-
tion Act was amended in October 1986 by the Federal Technology Transfer Act (FTFA).
Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-05,
3707-10(d), 3711-14 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 210 (2000)). The MITA was intended to pro-
mote technology transfer by authorizing government-operated laboratories to enter into
cooperative research agreements and by establishing a Federal Laboratory Consortium for
Technology Transfer within the National Science Foundation. See S. REP. No. 99-283, at
1-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3442, 3442-44. The Act stimulated transfer of
government-owned technology to the private sector by awarding laboratories and inventors
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realized with federal funding, both 1980 amendments ostensibly sup-
ported the primary goals of the patent system: encouraging public dis-
closure of novel discoveries and providing economic incentives for
inventors to continue exploring new technologies.1 12 The legislation
bestowed legal authority upon universities, small businesses, and fed-
eral research laboratories to collaborate with interested commercial
organizations, to earn revenues by licensing technologies developed
with federal funding, and to pursue a variety of technology-transfer
opportunities." 3 Since 1980, collaboration between universities and
small businesses in the biotechnology industry dramatically increased,
as have the number of patent applications filed and issued patents
resulting from government-sponsored university research.1 14 It is not
yet clear whether these increases correlate with passage of the 1980
amendments. 11 5
b. Negotiating the Patent Thicket
Because it has been much easier to obtain a biotech patent in
recent years, biotechnology companies and university researchers pat-
ented or attempted to patent an increasing number of useful methods
and reagents." 6 These research tools are generally applicable in up-
cash or a portion of licensing royalties that resulted from the transfer. Id. It also required
government scientists to report inventions with commercial potential or possible health
benefits for transfer to the private sector. See id.
112 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 70-76 (discussing various economic theories
underlying the U.S. patent system and the incentives to invent, disclose, commercialize, or
design around existing proprietary technologies).
I 13 See Sidebottom, supra note 105, at 227.
114 See The Bayh-Dole Act, a Review of Patent Issues in Federally Funded Research: Hearing on
Pub. L. No. 96-517 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaiy Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 33-37 (1994) (statement of Howard W. Bremer on behalf
of the Association of University Technology Managers and the Council on Governmental
Relations). See generally ASS'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY:. FY
2000: A SURVEY SUMMARY OF TECHNOLOGY LICENSING (AND RELATED) PERFORMANCE FOR U.S.
AND CANADIAN ACADEMIC AND NoN-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS, AND PATENT MANAGEMENT FIRMS,
available at http://www.autm.net/surveys/2000/summarynoe.pdf (last visited Jan. 19,
2004) (collecting statistics on patent applications filed, patents allowed, and licensing reve-
nues earned by AUTM member institutions for fiscal year 2000).
115 See generally Rebecca Henderson et al., Universities as a Source of Commercial Technol-
ogy: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965-1988, 80 Rnv. ECON. & STAT. 119, 119-26
(1998) ("suggest[ing] that the observed increase in university patenting may reflect an
increase in their propensity to patent" rather than expanded research output (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Mowery et al., supra note 102, at 103-16 (analyzing the impact
of the Bayh-Dole Act on patent filings and licensing revenues at Columbia University, the
University of California, and Stanford University).
116 See Walsh et al., supra note 3, at 289-90, 296-97. A reagent is a component of a
biological or chemical reaction that is used in experimentation or production because of
its chemical or biological activity. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 954 (1981).
Useful reagents that companies or individual researchers routinely patent include
monoclonal antibodies, genomic or cDNA libraries, plasmids, cloned cDNAs, ESTs, or
thermostable DNA polymerases used in the polymerase chain reaction (PCR). See WORK-
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stream research, "i.e., research that is relatively far removed from a
commercial end product."117 Upstream patents frequently increase
basic research costs by requiring researchers to license essential re-
search tools. 118 For example, a pharmaceutical company attempting
to develop drugs for the treatment of Alzheimer's disease might want
access to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequences from genes impli-
cated in the development and progression of the disease. 119 Partial
gene sequences could be used to search for a full-length copy of the
same gene; 120 full-length sequences could be used to produce recom-
binant protein for a variety of research applications. 12 1 Depending on
the number of genes involved, a company might have to license doz-
ens, even hundreds of genes or gene fragments. 122 If more than one
company owns patents on the genes or gene fragments, a researcher
might have to negotiate many different licenses.123 Alternatively, pat-
ent holders may choose to eliminate their competition by refusing to
license rights to use the genes or by charging exorbitant license
fees. 124 Even though most companies successfully negotiate licenses,
the transaction costs related to this "patent thicket," whether in the
form of royalty payments or legal and administrative costs, might soon
be high enough to deter research. 125
Proponents of the patent system assume that most patent holders
will act rationally to maximize the economic utility of their inventions
SHOP SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 40-51. Useful methods include PCR and methods for
inducing expression of recombinant proteins in bacteria or the construction of cDNA
micro-arrays. See id. at 48-55. Methods and reagents are often referred to as "research
tools." See id. at 48. Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit has defined a research tool as "a
product or method whose purpose is use in the conduct of research, whether the tool is an
analytical balance, an assay kit, a laser device[,] . . .or a biochemical method such as the
PCR . . . ." Integra Lifescis. I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117 Rai, supra note 3, at 816. The farther "upstream" a patented research tool is used,
the more "downstream" products and processes it affects. Id. at 816-23 (advocating nar-
row rights in upstream research and technology in order to encourage competition); see
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698 (defining "upstream" as "premarket" and discuss-
ing how changes in patent policy have caused the gradual shift of biotechnology research
"from a commons model toward a privatization model").
118 See Rai, supra note 3, at 816-17.
119 See id. at 816.
120 Id.
121 See id.
122 See Resnik, supra note 9, at 4.
123 See Rai, supra note 3, at 816-17.
124 See Resnik, supra note 9, at 4. For example, Myriad Genetics, a company based in
Salt Lake City, Utah, holds patents on BRCA1 and BRCA2, two genes associated with pre-
disposition to breast and ovarian cancer. Id. at 6. Myriad developed tests to detect BRCAI
and BRCA2 mutations and charges $2,300 per test. Id. The company "has licensed only a
few laboratories to conduct the test," at a fee of $1,200 per use, in addition to the cost of
performing the test itself. Id,
125 Id.
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by freely granting licenses.1 26 Although that has been true in most
industries, it may not always be the case in biotechnology, where inno-
vations "stand on the shoulders" of previous inventions. 127 Patent
holders are not obligated to license their technologies to competing
researchers: they may refuse to grant licenses12s or hold out against
the tantalizing possibility of extraordinary future profits. 129 Thus, in
biotechnology and other "cumulative systems technologies," granting
expansive intellectual property rights may increase litigation and
other transaction costs.' 3 0 Ultimately, the rush to the PTO may hin-
der the free and open exchange of ideas and research materials that
fueled the development of the biotechnology industry in the first
place. 31
Perhaps to thwart such economically irrational behavior, Con-
gress allowed federally funded researchers to retain title to their in-
ventions, but also required them to convey a nonexclusive license on
the federal government to use those inventions. 13 2 The requirement
provides other federally supported researchers with inexpensive or
free access to new technologies.13 3 Given the proliferation of private
biotechnology companies and increasingly frequent collaborations be-
tween private companies and public sector researchers, however, this
provision alone will not solve the problem.
II
BASIC CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY
The inclination to assert property rights in biotechnology inven-
tions paralleled the growth in federal funding for basic biomedical
126 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN.
265, 278 (1977).
127 See Walsh et al., supra note 3, at 289.
128 See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204-05 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding
that unilateral refusal to license lawfully acquired patents is permitted under the patent
laws and thus cannot trigger antitrust liability); United States v. Telecs. Proprietary, Ltd.,
607 F. Supp. 753, 755 (D. Colo. 1983) (noting that the unilateral right to refuse to grant a
license is the essence of the patent monopoly); Resnik, supra note 9, at 5. However, when a
patent holder has significant market power in its industry, its refusal to license technology
may trigger antitrust liability. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386,
436-37 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting in part).
129 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698.
130 See Kitch, supra note 126, at 276-78 (providing examples of transaction costs that
might accrue).
131 See Amy Ligler, Egregious Error or Admirable Advance: The Memorandum of Understand-
ing That Enables Federally Funded Basic Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 2001 DuKE L. &
TECH. REV. 37 (2001), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/
2001dltr0037.html (discussing the impact of a ban on federal funding for stem cell re-
search, the reliance of stem cell researchers on private funding, and the consequences of
allowing some stem cell patents to rest entirely in the private sector).
132 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)( 4 ) (2000).
133 See id.
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research that began in the late 1960s.13 4 Three factors encouraged
this tendency: (1) a-series of court rulings that greatly expanded the
acceptable range of patentable subject matter for biotechnological in-
ventions; 35 (2) efforts to strengthen international protection for in-
tellectual property rights;' 36 and (3) implementation of progressively
more liberal PTO examination guidelines, which made it considerably
easier to obtain patents on biotech inventions. 137 Taken together,
these changes in federal policy stimulated biotechnology research and
triggered a feverish race to the patent office for academic and indus-
trial researchers alike. 138
Part I suggested that neither the traditional approach of leaving
all government-sponsored inventions in the public domain nor the
modern approach of granting exclusive rights to private parties
134 See Mowery et al., supra note 102, at 100.
135 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305, 308-09 (1980) (holding that a
new strain of bacteria produced by artificial bacterial recombination was a patentable in-
vention and concluding that patentable subject matter includes "anything under the sun
that is made by man" (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038
(C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated sub nom. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978) (holding that a
biologically pure culture of a naturally occurring bacterium is patentable); Ex parte Allen, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d 1425, 1427-28 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1987) (stating that the PTO considers
nonnaturally occurring, nonhuman multicellular organisms, including animals, to be pat-
entable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101); Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q.
443, 447 (Bd. App. & Interf. 1985) (extending Chakrabarty to hold that manmade multicel-
lular plants not found in nature are patentable).
136 See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs]. The TRIPs agreement was part of the Final
Act of the 1994 Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1154 [hereinafter GATT]. The agreement is
founded on the notion that "the failure to protect intellectual property rights distorts the
flow of free trade and undermines the ... benefits flowing from the GATT system." JULIE
E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 53 (2002).
137 See, e.g., Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 12, at 274 (describing changes in U.S.
patent policy designed to encourage scientists to seek patent protection, including estab-
lishment of the pro-patent CAFC in 1982, passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, and "a
trend toward broadening the definition of patentable subject matter"); Worrall, supra note
68, at 131-133 (discussing the changing approach of the PTO toward evaluating the utility
of biotechnological inventions). But see Mary Breen Smith, Comment, An End to Gene Pat-
ents? The Human Genome Project Versus the United States Patent and Trademark Office's 1999
Utility Guidelines, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 747, 770-84 (2002) (suggesting that application of
the PTO's new Utility Guidelines to new gene patents will make it considerably more diffi-
cult to patent genes).
138 See, e.g., PTO SUMMARY, FY 1999, supra note 42 (collecting a wide range of data on
filed patent applications and allowed patents for fiscal year 1999); Mowery et al., supra note
102, at 103-04 (discussing the increase in patent applications, patents allowed, and licens-
ing royalties that American universities have collected since 1980). Several commentators
have observed that the landmark case Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), opened
the floodgates to biotechnology research and development. See, e.g., L. Christopher Plein,
Biotechnology: Issue Development and Evolution, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: ASSESSING SOCIAL IMPACTS
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 147, 156, 158-59 (DavidJ. Webber ed., 1990) (internal quotation
marks omitted). One scholar even characterized Chakrabarty "as the driving force behind
the commercial development of biotechnology." Id. at 158.
1012
2004] A MODEST PROPOSAL 1013
should extend to all inventions. 139 The process of scientific discovery
and commercialization of new technologies is complex, variable, and
unpredictable. Thus, allowing government-sponsored inventions to
remain in private hands might accelerate the development of com-
mercial applications for some new technologies, while others might
never yield a commercially viable product unless they are left in the
public domain.1 40 This Part reviews the basic concepts of modern bio-
technology and the courts' handling of biotechnological inventions
while arguing that a different approach is required.
A. The Building Blocks of Biotechnology
Modern genetics and molecular biology originated with Freder-
ick Miescher's discovery of DNA in 1869.141 At about the same time,
Gregor Mendel proposed that genes were the unit of information that
governed the inheritance of particular physical traits. 142 Following
the discovery that DNA molecules contained the universal determi-
nants of genetic behavior, 143 scientists proceeded to investigate pre-
cisely how a living organism used the information contained in that
genetic blueprint to guide growth and development. 44
In 1953, James Watson and Francis Crick published a paper
describing the physical structure of a DNA molecule.1 45 Subsequent
experimentation revealed that information is stored in DNA as spe-
139 See Eisenberg, Patenting Problems, supra note 28, at 165-66.
140 See id. at 165. For example, compare the semiconductor industry, in which patents
played a critical role in technological development, with the software industry, in which
leaving Linux computer code in the public domain provided the impetus for a wide variety
of improvements. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REv. 1575, 1693-95 (2003); Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for
Copyright Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1345 (2003); see also Burk & Lem-
ley, supra note 7, at 1156 (arguing that patent law is unified only in theory because applica-
tion of conventional patent law doctrine is technology-specific).
141 See MAXINE SINGER & PAUL BERG, GENES & GENOMES: A CHANGING PERSPECTIVE 23
(1991). Miescher recognized that DNA was chemically distinct from proteins based on its
comparatively high phosphate content and resistance to chemical treatments that easily
destroyed protein. Id,
142 SeeJAMES D. WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 8-11 (4th ed. 1987)
(describing Mendel's experiments and the rules of genetic inheritance derived there-
from). Although Mendel's discovery came in the 1860s, his findings were not disseminated
until 1900, 16 years after his death. See id. at 8.
143 See SINGER & BERG, supra note 141, at 23. Oswald Avery and his colleagues, along
with Alfred Hershey and Margaret Chase, performed the experiments demonstrating that
DNA alone carries genetic information. Id
144 See id. at 23-34 (reviewing a series of groundbreaking experiments that determined
how DNA replicated, mutated, and passed from one generation to the next and how ge-
netic characteristics were physically expressed).
145 See Watson & Crick, supra note 2, at 737. James Watson, Francis Crick, and Maurice
Wilkins shared the 1962 Nobel Prize in Physiology/Medicine for their pioneering work.
See Nobel e-Museum, at http://www.nobei.se/medicine/laureates/1962/index.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2004).
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cific base sequences called genes. 146 Genes contain the "instructions"
for initiating and regulating various biochemical processes that com-
prise the biological phenomenon of life. 147 A complex series of bio-
chemical manipulations eventually transform genetic instructions into
active molecules of ribonucleic acid (RNA)148 or protein, 149 which ini-
tiate or regulate the metabolic activities essential to life.150 Scientists
refer to these various biochemical manipulations as the process of
"gene expression.115
146 See, e.g., SINGER & BERG, supra note 141, at 29-34 (describing the work uncovering
the relationship between specific DNA sequences and particular physical characteristics or
phenotypes that led to discovery of the genetic code).
147 See id.
148 See id. at 54-59.
149 See id. at 59-71. Proteins are biopolymers, much like DNA or RNA, but they are
composed of twenty monomer units called amino acids, notjust four nucleotide bases. See
id. Because proteins assume a much greater range of physical structures than nucleic
acids, they are more structurally diverse and biochemically versatile than either DNA or
RNA. See id, Thus, "[piroteins are the principal determinants of an organism's" physical
characteristics. Id. at 29. Because nucleic acids contain only four different bases while
proteins contain twenty different amino acids, mRNA is "read" in base triplets (called
codons) during translation. There are 43=64 possible base triplets in DNA and mRNA:
sixty-one specify particular amino acids, and three tell the protein synthesis machinery to
stop making protein. See id. at 29-40, 131-32. The sixty-one codons specify only twenty
different amino acids, so "several codons can specify the same amino acid," id, at 132 (e.g.,
the amino acid glycine is encoded by four codons: G-G-A, G-G-C, G-G-G, and G-G-U, id. at
155). Thus, because of the possibility for redundancy, the genetic code is often called
"degenerate." See id. at 131-32. This degeneracy often poses problems for satisfying the
written description requirement imposed by 35 U.S.C. § 112. See, e.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984
F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
150 See SINGER & BERG, supra note 141, at 54-59.
151 See id. at 35. Gene expression involves the transfer of genetic information from
DNA to RNA and from RNA to protein. See id. at 54. Through a process called transcrip-
tion, an RNA molecule is copied using a single DNA strand as a template. See WATSON ET
AL., supra note 142, at 363-64. The resulting RNA molecule, called message RNA (mRNA),
then guides the synthesis of a protein through a process called translation. Sometimes
RNA transcripts and not proteins are the final products of gene expression; this is the case
with transfer RNA (tRNA) and ribosomal RNA (rRNA), both of which play essential roles
in protein synthesis. See id. at 400. Most of the time, mRNA transcripts undergo extensive
processing during which base sequences that do not specify protein sequences (called in-
trons, for intervening sequences) are removed from the RNA molecule. The remaining
mRNA sequences specifying the particular protein sequence of the gene product (called
exons, for expressed sequences) are spliced together to produce a functional mRNA tran-
script that can then undergo translation to produce its protein product. See id. at 626-37.
Processed mRNA transcripts may be fully or partially copied back into DNA using a viral
enzyme called a reverse transcriptase. A full-length DNA copy of a processed mRNA tran-
script is called a cDNA (for complementary DNA), while a partial copy is called an EST
(for expressed sequence tag). See id. at 609-11. The question of whether cDNA and EST
sequences derived from genes of unknown function constitute patentable subject matter
has been extremely controversial in recent years, in large part because so many biotechnol-
ogy companies have attempted to patent such sequences. In 1997, there were "at least 350
patent applications, covering at least 500,000 gene sequence tags, pending before the"
PTO. Courtney J. Miller, Comment, Patent Law and Human Genomics, 26 CAP. U. L. REV.
893, 894 n.3 (1997) (citing Eliot Marshall, Companies Rush To Patent DNA, 275 Scl. 780, 781
(1997)); see also Byron V. Olsen, The Biotechnology Balancing Act: Patents for Gene Fragments,
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In 1970, scientists discovered that many kinds of bacteria possess
DNA sequence-specific enzymes called restriction enzymes.1 52 Re-
searchers soon began to develop laboratory methods using the puri-
fied and active enzymes.153 At about this time, Arthur Kornberg and
his colleagues identified and characterized a variety of other enzymes
involved in DNA synthesis.' 54 With the help of restriction enzymes,
scientists isolated an enzyme-DNA ligase-that joins the ends of
DNA molecules. This finding suggested that pieces of DNA from dif-
ferent sources could be linked to produce a single hybrid DNA mole-
cule. 155 In 1972, Paul Berg produced the first so-called recombinant
DNA molecule, using restriction enzymes and DNA ligase.156 Shortly
thereafter, researchers in Stanley Cohen's lab demonstrated that a re-
combinant DNA molecule containing pieces of DNA from two differ-
ent species could be inserted and maintained within individual cells of
Escherichia coli ("E. coli") bacteria.1 57
and Licensing the "Useful Arts", 7 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 295, 306-307 (1997) (discussing the
National Institutes of Health (NIH)'s unsuccessful attempts to patent hundreds of gene
fragments); John Murray, Note, Owning Genes: Disputes Involving DNA Sequence Patents, 75
CHI.-KEr L. REv. 231, 236-37 (1999) (discussing the race to patent ESTs and other gene
fragments).
152 See WATSON ET AL., supra note 142, at 88 (citing Hamilton 0. Smith & K.W. Wilcox,
A Restriction Enzyme from Hemophilus influenzae: I. Purification and General Properties, 51 J.
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 379 (1970)). Members of this class of enzymes recognize a specific
sequence of DNA bases from four to eight bases in length and cut DNA molecules at that
sequence. For example, one such enzyme isolated from the commonly used bacterium
Escherichia coli ("E. coli'), called Eco RI (for E. coli restriction enzyme I), recognizes and cuts
the target sequence of bases G-A-A-T-T-C. Similarly, the enzyme isolated from H. influenzae
by Hamilton Smith, called Hin dIII (for H. influenzae Rd enzyme III), recognizes and cuts
the target sequence A-A-C-C-T-T. Id. at 88-89.
153 See id.
154 See Arthur Kornberg, Mechanisms of Replication of the Escherichia coli Chromosome,
137 EUR. J. BIOCHEMISTRY 377 (1983); see also WATSON ET AL., supra note 142, at 282-301
(reviewing the various enzymes required to synthesize complete DNA molecules during the
process of DNA replication); Martin Gellert, DNA Topoisomerases, 50 ANN. REv. BIOCHEMIS-
TRY 879, 880 (1981) (addressing "new insights into the influence of topoisomerases and
DNA supercoiling on biological functions"); I. R. Lehman, DNA Ligase: Structure, Mecha-
nism, and Function, 186 SCI. 790, 797 (1974) (concluding that "DNA ligase is... an essential
enzyme required for normal DNA replication and repair in E. coli').
155 WATSON ET AL., supra note 142, at 88-89. DNA molecules containing sequences
from different organisms are called recombinant DNA molecules. Id.
156 See David A. Jackson, Robert H. Symons & Paul Berg, Biochemical Method for Inserting
New Genetic Information into DNA of Simian Virus 40: Circular SV40 DNA Molecules Containing
Lambda Phage Genes and the Galactose Operon of Escherichia Coli, 69 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. Sci.
USA 2904 (1972).
157 See Cohen et al., supra note 4, at 3240. The recombinant DNA molecule used in
that experiment was called a plasmid. Id. A plasmid typically contains: 1) a short sequence
(called an origin of replication) that confers the ability to be copied by the host cell; 2) a
selectable marker (usually a gene that confers resistance to an antibiotic such as ampicil-
lin); and 3) a series of recognition sequences for a variety of different restriction enzymes
at which the desired piece of DNA may be inserted. See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 320-21 (3d ed. 1994) (describing different kinds of plasmids used in
manipulating recombinant DNA).
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These trailblazing experiments unleashed a torrent of new labo-
ratory methods 158 that transformed the study of biology and advanced
both biological research and drug development. 159 Recombinant
DNA technology quickly developed more complex and sophisticated
plasmids that enabled the expression of protein molecules either in
living bacterial cells or in vitro using isolated translation machinery. 160
Consequently, the pharmaceutical industry shifted its drug develop-
ment strategy from isolating and characterizing the active ingredients
of traditional folk remedies161 to exploiting new high-throughput
screening and combinatorial chemistry technologies and taking ad-
vantage of recombinant DNA technology. 162 In the past, "much of the
difficulty in using recombinant DNA techniques" lay in identifying,
cloning, sequencing, and expressing the genes that encoded particu-
lar proteins. 163 Recent technological advances in laboratory methods
and automation have simplified much of this process, turning a variety
of tasks that previously required considerable effort and ingenuity
into matters of routine. 164
158 See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 157, at 291-331; David J. Galas & Albert Schmitz,
DNAse Footprinting: A Simple Method for the Detection of Protein-DNA Binding Specificity, 5 Nu-
CLEIC ACIDS RES. 3157 (1978) (DNA footprinting); Keiichi Itakura et al., Synthesis and Use of
Synthetic Oligonucleotides, 53 ANN. REV. BIOCHEMISTRY 323 (1984) (chemical synthesis of
DNA oligonucleotides); K6hler & Milstein, supra note 4, at 495; Tom Maniatis et al., The
Isolation of Structural Genes from Libraries of Eucaryotic DNA, 15 CELL 687 (1978) (genomic
and cDNA libraries); Mullis & Faloona, supra note 4, at 335; Schena et al., supra note 4, at
467; E. M. Southern, Detection of Specific Sequences Among DNA Fragments Separated by Gel Elec-
trophoresis, 98 J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 503 (1975) (gel-transfer hybridization).
159 See generally WORKSHOP SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 50 (describing the research strat-
egy of the biotechnology industry as attempting to isolate a single useful protein, to clone
and patent the gene that encoded it, and finally to produce a pure, therapeutically active
recombinant version of the protein, examples of which include insulin and
erythropoietin).
160 See, e.g., Paulina Balbas & Francisco Bolivar, Design and Construction of Expression
Plasmid Vectors in Escherichia coli, 185 METHODS ENZYMOLOGY 14 (1990). In vitro is Latin
for "in glass" and has become shorthand for "in the lab," in contrast to work done in vivo
("in one that is living"), which describes experimentation performed in a living cell or
organism. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 711 (3d ed. 1997) (defining in
vitro as "isolated from the living organism and artificially maintained, as in a test tube").
161 See Lawrence M. Gelbert & Richard E. Gregg, Will Genetics Really Revolutionize the
Drug Discovery Process? 8 CURRENT OP. BIOTECH. 669, 669 (1997). Many drugs now on the
market are pharmaceutically active molecules isolated from naturally occurring plants. See
id. Before the advent of recombinant DNA technology, pharmaceutical researchers typi-
cally began searching for new drugs by synthesizing a library of chemically related deriva-
tives of a successful drug. The library of candidate compounds would then be screened for
the desired biological activity. This time-consuming and expensive process rarely yields
promising drug candidates. See id.
162 See, e.g., Mariana Vaschetto et al., Enabling High-Throughput Discovery, 6 CURRENT Op.
DRUG DISC. & DEV. 377, 377 (2003).
163 Golden, supra note 27, at 114-15; see, e.g., ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 157, at 308-18
(summarizing the advantages and disadvantages of commonly used cloning methods).
164 See Anita Varma & David Abraham, DNA Is Different: Legal Obviousness and the Balance
Between Biotech Inventors and the Market, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 53, 65 (1996) (describing how
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B. Patentable Subject Matter in Biotechnology
The Patent Act traditionally limited the subject matter of patents
to "invention Es] or discover[ies]." 65 The U.S. Code defines a patent-
able invention or discovery as "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof."166 The term "process" encompasses any "process, art
or method, [including] a new use of a known process, machine, man-
ufacture, composition of matter, or material."1 67
While the statute ostensibly limits the breadth of patentable sub-
ject matter, its expansive language suggests that Congress "plainly con-
templated that the patent laws would be given wide scope."1 68 Under
traditional patent doctrine, "[t]he laws of nature, physical phenom-
ena, and abstract ideas" are generally not patentable. 169 For example,
neither Einstein's theory of relativity nor Newton's laws of motion
could have been patented because they are "manifestations of ... na-
ture, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.' 170 Similarly, a
newly discovered plant or chemical element cannot be patented, de-
spite the statutory definition of an invention as an "invention or dis-
covery."' 71 This is known as the "product of nature" doctrine: 172 an
inventor cannot patent a product that occurs in nature "in essentially
the same form. 173
DNA-related biotechnology has progressed significantly in recent years, allowing a bi-
otechnologist to simply sit down at a computer, enter a data bank, and predict a protein's
entire sequence).
165 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2000).
166 Id. § 101 (emphasis added). Novelty and utility are evaluated separately according
to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, respectively.
167 Id. § 100(b). A process is simply a method to produce a desired result as, for exam-
ple, by mixing an aqueous solution of DNA with sodium acetate and ethyl alcohol to pre-
cipitate the DNA from solution as a sodium salt. See Bruce A. Roe, Concentration of DNA by
Ethanol Precipitation, at http://iprotocol.mit.edu/protocol/64.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2004). For purposes of this Note, "[a] machine is an assemblage of parts that transmit
forces, motion, and energy to one another in a predetermined manner." HERBERT F.
SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 63 (3d ed. 2001). Further, "[a] composition of mat-
ter is a new substance resulting from the combination of two or more different ingredi-
ents." Id. (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)). Finally, "[a]
manufacture ... is anything man-made that is not a machine or a composition of matter."
Id. (citing Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Aiken, 203 F. 699 (3d Cir. 1913)).
168 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
169 Id. at 309.
170 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
171 35 U.S.C. § 100(a); see Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-14 (noting the exception that
genetically modified plants may now be the subject of utility patent applications under 35
U.S.C. § 101).
172 DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02(7), at 7-20 (2003).
173 John M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of
Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (Part II), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 371, 373 (2003).
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In the landmark case Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court
held that a product of biotechnology will comprise patentable subject
matter only if it is a "product of human ingenuity" in the form of "a
non [-] naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter."'1 74
Federal courts consistently refuse to grant patents for newly discov-
ered natural phenomena. 175 However, the Chakrabarty Court inter-
preted the language of the 1952 Patent Act and its amendments
broadly to mean that "anything under the sun.., made by man" was
patentable. 1 76 To obtain a patent on any naturally occurring matter,
therefore, an inventor need only "appl[y] ... the law[s] of nature to a
new and useful end."177 Likewise, in order to patent a gene, the in-
ventor must isolate the gene from nature, purify it, and determine its
sequence. 178 The PTO has applied this rationale in granting patents
for a variety of biotechnological inventions, such as cloned DNA se-
quences, stem cell lines, purified recombinant proteins, and trans-
174 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
175 See Am. Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. 566, 596-99 (1874)
(suggesting that purification of a preexisting natural substance does not render it patenta-
ble subject matter unless the product is significantly altered). In evaluating a patent claim-
ing, inter alia, a purified form of cellulose isolated from wood and straw, Justice Strong
noted:
There are many things well known and valuable in medicine or in the arts
which may be extracted from divers[e] substances. But the extract is the
same, no matter from what it has been taken. A process to obtain it from a
subject from which it has never been taken may be the creature of inven-
tion, but the thing itself when obtained cannot be called a new
manufacture.
Id. at 593-94.
176 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted). One author of the
1952 Patent Act used virtually identical language to describe the intended breadth of 35
U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 309 n.6 (quoting Hearings on H.R 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1951) (testimony of P.J. Federico, a
principal draftsman of the 1952 Patent Act)).
177 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). This require-
ment dates to the first quarter of the twentieth century and applied to biological materials
well before the advent of recombinant DNA technology. See In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d
1394, 1395, 1401-02 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (reversing the patent examiner's rejection of claims
for purified prostaglandins, molecules involved in regulating the inflammatory response);
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (upholding a
patent for purified adrenaline).
178 See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The
court reasoned that, because naturally occurring chemicals are patentable once a re-
searcher has isolated one from nature and determined its chemical structure and because
DNA is a chemical compound, DNA sequences are also patentable once they have been
sequenced. See id. Accordingly, DNA that has been isolated from an organism and se-
quenced constitutes patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) and according
to the CAFC. See Smith, supra note 137, at 760. This pragmatic approach echoes John
Locke's opinion that "[tlhe labour of [a man's] body, and the work of his hands . .. are
properly his[,]" so that "[w]hatsoever ... he removes out of the state that nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labourwith, and joined to it something that is his
own, and thereby makes it his property." JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT
§ 27, at 209 (John Bumpus 1821) (1680).
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genic animals.179 Chakrabarty's progeny further expanded the scope of
patentable subject matter in biotechnology to cover biologically pure
cultures of naturally occurring bacteria;I 0 manmade multicellular
plants not found in nature; 181 and non-naturally occurring, nonhu-
man multicellular organisms, including animals.' 8 2
This increasingly expansive definition of patentable subject mat-
ter has sparked controversy. For example, attempts by the NIH to pat-
ent thousands of "expressed sequence tags" (ESTs), partial gene
cDNA sequences identified during the human genome project, trig-
gered public outrage.'83 In 1992, research scientist Craig Venter-
then working for the NIH-filed three applications seeking patent
protection for more than 6,800 ESTs, mostly of unknown function.8 4
Although Venter and the NIH ultimately dropped their requests for
patent protection, 8 5 their actions spurred intense debate' 86 that has
continued as ever-growing numbers of private biotechnology compa-
nies undertake basic research on DNA sequences and then seek to
patent them.1 8 7
III
THE ECONOMICS OF PATENT PROTECTION IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
The PTO issues patents to inventors as an incentive to develop
and commercialize new technologies, thereby securing for the public
179 See Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel
and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REv. 303, 307-08
(2002).
180 See In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated sub nom. Parker v.
Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).
181 See Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 447 (Bd. App. & Interf. 1985).
182 See, e.g., Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
183 See, e.g., Christopher Anderson, U.S. Patent Application Stirs up Gene Hunters, 353
NATURE 485, 485-86 (1991); Olsen, supra note 151, at 306-07; Leslie Roberts, Genome Pat-
ent Fight Erupts, 254 Sci. 184, 184-85 (1991). An EST is a piece of cDNA that encodes a
partial gene sequence-of known or unknown function-that is transcribed into mRNA.
NAT'L CTR. FOR BIOTECH. INFO., A SCIENCE PRIMER, ESTs: GENE DIsCOVERY MADE EASIER 2,
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/est.html (last accessed Jan. 20,
2004). ESTs are usually obtained by random sampling of cDNA libraries and typically con-
tain 200 to 500 base pairs. Id. Because they are comparatively inexpensive to produce and
relatively quick to obtain, ESTs are useful research tools in the preliminary steps of isolat-
ing genes, identifying coding regions of genomic DNA, and analyzing patterns of gene
expression in living tissue. See Tyra G. Wolfsberg & David Landsman, A Comparison of Ex-
pressed Sequence Tags (ESTs) to Human Genomic Sequences, 25 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 1626,
1626-31 (1997). These methods use the cDNA fragments as tags to "fish" desirable genes
out of chromosomal DNA or from a cDNA library by hybridization. See id. at 1631-32.
184 Jonathan Kahn, What's the Use? Law and Authority in Patenting Human Genetic Mate-
rial, 14 STAN. L. & POL'v REV. 417, 420 (2003).
185 See Christopher Anderson, NIH Drops Bid for Gene Patents, 263 ScI. 909, 909-10
(1994).
186 Kahn, supra note 184, at 420.
187 Murray, supra note 151, at 237-39.
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the myriad benefits of scientific progress. 188 Although policymakers
generally accept this utilitarian justification,1 89 it is not clear that the
existing patent system actually "promote[s] the Progress of Science
and useful Arts" t90 as intended, or that the current system is the most
efficient way to do so. 191 Nevertheless, the federal government
amended the Patent Act of 1952192 and relaxed the PTO examination
guidelines to encourage the development and commercialization of
the fledgling biotechnology industry.19 3 In addition, federal courts
have construed the statutory requirements of patentability expan-
sively, 194 causing the number of biotechnology patents granted since
1980 to soar.195 With the increase in such patents, however, experi-
188 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 12; Svatos, supra note 21, at 113-14 (quoting
HACKING, supra note 25, at 46).
189 A number of commentators have asserted that a strong regime of intellectual prop-
erty protection is essential to the survival of the emerging biotechnology industry, but few
as emphatically as Andrew Hacking:
Patenting is necessary to ensure that producers of new inventions or inno-
vations receive a return on their investment in research and development.
It is justified as being essential to induce innovation and to support re-
search. Information may be expensive to produce but relatively cheap to
copy. In biotechnology as elsewhere patents are an indispensable element
in research and development, and much effort must be directed to ensure
that work is patentable, otherwise it may have little commercial value.
HACKING, supra note 25, at 43-44.
190 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Svatos, supra note 21, at 116-17.
191 This Note takes the position that stimulation of technological progress in general,
and biotechnology in particular, is justified on utilitarian grounds.
192 See Federal Technology Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-05, 3707-10(d), 3711-14 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 210 (2000));
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-15 (2000)); Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat.
3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2000)).
193 See Worrall, supra note 68, at 123; Smith, supra note 137, at 748-51 (discussing
application of the 1999 PTO Utility Guidelines to new gene patents). Relaxing the exami-
nation guidelines has resulted in the PTO allowing extremely broad claims on biotechnol-
ogy inventions, particularly compared with typical chemical cases. See Lentz, supra note 24,
at 318.
194 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); In re Bergy, 563 F.2d
1031, 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated sub nom. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978); Exparte
Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 447 (Bd. App. & Interf. 1985). Statistical analysis of decisions
by the CAFC led one leading commentator to conclude "that the enforcement climate [in
the context of infringement litigation] in the United States . . . strongly favors" patent
holders. HARMON, supra note 24, at 1136.
195 For example, 2,160 biotechnology patents issued in 1989, compared with 7,005 in
2000. Biotechnology Industry Organization Survey, available at http://www.bio.org/er/sta-
tistics.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2004). The number of individual biotechnology firms receiv-
ing more than fifty patents in the previous six years also increased from zero in 1990 to
thirteen in 1999. See Walsh et al., supra note 3, at 295 (citing Diana Hicks et al., The
Changing Composition of Innovative Activity in the U.S.-A Portrait Based on Patent Analysis, 30
RES. POL'y 681, 682 (2001)). This increase paralleled an overall growth in patenting activ-
ity across all technologies. For example, 104,219 utility applications were filed with the
PTO in 1980, compared to 270,646 in 1999. Similarly, 56,618 utility patents issued in 1980,
compared to 142,856 in 1999. See PTO SUMMARY, FY 1999, supra note 42, at tbl. 2.
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mentation has become more expensive, time-consuming, and diffi-
cult-in large part because biotechnology developments frequently
depend upon access to previously invented (and often patented) re-
search tools, methods, and reagents.19 6 This Part discusses the eco-
nomics of innovation and the potential impact of strong patent
protection coupled with ever-growing numbers of patents for bi-
otechnological inventions upon follow-on research.' 97
A. Biotechnology As a Commercial Enterprise
Unlike the pharmaceutical industry, which several well-estab-
lished multinational companies dominate, the emerging biotechnol-
ogy industry in the United States consists of several hundred small,
privately held companies that depend heavily on private funding to
survive. ' 98 While venture capital firms commonly provide most of the
industry's startup funds and initial operating capital in exchange for
stock and some degree of management control, virtually all new bio-
technology companies require significant additional funding before
they can market a product derived from their research. 199 Companies
typically obtain such funding by one of three means: 1) "enter[ing]
into a research collaboration agreement with . . . [another] com-
pany";200 2) "mak[ing] an initial public offering (IPO) of stock";20 1 or
3) licensing their intellectual property to other companies. 20 2 Be-
cause of the lengthy, expensive research and development process
and the extensive testing required to obtain Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) approval of a new drug, few biotechnology startups ever
196 See Eisenberg, Biotechnology Research, supra note 21, at 177; Heller & Eisenberg, supra
note 14, at 698-99; Marshall, supra note 26, at 255-56 (reporting that the growing propen-
sity of biotechnology researchers to patent their research tools and methods has produced
legal problems for both biotechnology companies and public sector scientific researchers
as the interests of patent holders and licensees increasingly conflict); Rai, supra note 3, at
816-17.
197 Follow-on research refers to research based upon an earlier, patented discovery.
198 PHILIP W. GRUBB, PATENTS FOR CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY-
FUNDAMENTALS OF GLOBAL LAW, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY 370 (1999).
199 Id.
200 Id. Startups that develop particularly promising technology may be able to initiate
a research collaboration agreement with a larger pharmaceutical company. See id. Typi-
cally, the pharmaceutical company then provides research funding and technical support
in exchange for licensing rights or royalty payments on sales of future products. Id.
201 Id. Although some companies have performed spectacularly well after such offer-
ings, they are an extremely risky business. Once a company's stock is publicly traded, its
value will rise (or fall) with the success (or failure) "of every.., clinical trial or unsubstanti-
ated rumour." Id. at 370-71. See also Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Rousel, Inc., 126 F.
Supp. 2d 69, 79 n.5 (D. Mass. 2001) (stating that "the publicly traded stocks of the litigants
would bob or dip in response to some random comment by the Court, the trial lawyers, or
a particular witness," thereby illustrating "the utterly speculative nature of the stock mar-
ket" at the time).
202 See id. at 370.
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get a product onto the market.203 For many companies, a patent port-
folio is the only potentially lucrative asset available for exploitation. 204
These companies rely upon patent licensing revenues for much of
their operating capital until they can develop a steady revenue
stream.20 5 Thus, by granting expansive patent protection to bi-
otechnological inventions, the government arguably subsidizes the
biotechnology industry.
B. Patents As Incentive To Innovate
American patent policy has long assumed that rewarding inven-
tors with the limited monopoly conferred by a patent grant will en-
courage innovation.20 6 A patent gives companies the opportunity to
recover research and development costs, thereby providing an incen-
tive to invest in further research. 20 7 Some commentators argue that
the PTO's tendency to grant biotechnology patents of extremely
broad scope dramatically altered the balance between providing in-
centives to the inventor and encouraging follow-on innovation, result-
ing in underutilization of many inventions. 20 8 Because some follow-
203 Id. at 371. Surveys estimate the total development time and cost required to get a
single drug from the laboratory to the pharmacy at ten years and several hundred million
dollars. See Golden, supra note 27, at 118. Because few startups have that amount of cash
and time, for many companies the best possible result is to be purchased by a larger com-
pany. See, e.g., John Cook, Venture Capital: Seattle Biotech Shakeout Under Way, Some Fear, SEAT-
TLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 30, 2002, at D1, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/
venture/84865vc3O.shtml (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
204 See GRUBB, supra note 198, at 373-76.
205 Id. at 370. With the recent wave of consolidation in the pharmaceutical industry
and the ever-rising cost of research and development, many startups have recognized the
long odds of getting a genetically engineered drug onto market. Consequently, some com-
panies have shifted their focus from producing drugs to "developing platform technologies
such as genomics or high-throughput screening[,] which can be used in collaboration with
large companies having the resources needed for drug development." Id.
206 See Svatos, supra note 21, at 114. Patents share some important features with mo-
nopolies but do not inherently create them. See, e.g., Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S.(11
Wall.) 516, 533 (1871) ("Letters patent are not to be regarded as monopolies . . . but as
public franchises granted . . . to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.").
207 See Svatos, supra note 21, at 114. The exclusive nature of the patent grant allows
inventors to recoup their investment in research and development in exchange for com-
pulsory public disclosure of technical details. This exchange is thought to maximize social
welfare by simultaneously encouraging inventors to increase the stock of beneficial techni-
cal knowledge and discouraging inefficient duplication of inventive effort. SeeJohn S. Lei-
bovitz, Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251, 2256 (2002). The
required public disclosure of inventions also provides an important stimulus for down-
stream research. Id. at 2257.
208 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 868 (1990). This tendency is particularly acute with respect
to pioneering technologies widely used in downstream research. See, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1344, 1345-46 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd, 802 F.2d
1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Genentech Inc. Receives Broad Patent for Basic Gene-Splicing Techniques,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1987, at 8. Note that K6hler and Milstein, who invented monoclonal
antibody technology, won a Nobel prize for their discovery and yet did not file a patent
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on inventions might result in products that are "significantly better
than the patented technology, broad patents could discourage useful
research.
209
Patent proponents maintain that the benefits of the patent system
outweigh the potential problems of granting inventors a temporary
monopoly. 210 The current patent system nevertheless encourages
wasteful duplication of effort, provides "an arbitrary incentive to fo-
cus" research on only those areas likely to yield patentable inventions,
and incurs "substantial legal and administrative costs." 211 Patents en-
courage "excessive duplication of effort"2 12 in at least two ways. First,
they encourage the development of "work-around" inventions that
"differ only slightly from the original patented invention." 213 Limited
funding for research and development should be devoted "to
build [ing] a better mousetrap rather than another variation on an old
one.'"214 The problem is even more severe when a researcher attempts
to duplicate technologies for which a substitute may not be availa-
ble.2 15 Second, they frequently launch "a race to invent."216 The re-
sulting inefficiencies may be especially acute in the biotechnology
industry, in which many companies are simultaneously attempting to
develop drugs to treat the same range of diseases.217 Such competi-
application, despite almost immediate recognition that their trailblazing research had tre-
mendous commercial potential. See Merges & Nelson, supra, at 905.
209 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 208, at 870.
210 See Svatos, supra note 21, at 117. Inventors have frequently taken advantage of their
monopoly to reap excessive profits. Consider the case of Milton Reynolds, the inventor of
the ballpoint pen. In 1945, Mr. Reynolds charged $12.50 for a pen that cost about $.80 to
manufacture and reaped profits of up to $500,000 a month on his initial investment of
$26,000. SeeWILLIAM P. ALBRECHT, JR., ECONOMics 467-68 (4th ed. 1986). In other cases,
inventors may refuse to license their proprietary technology, and instead zealously protect
it against infringement, thereby stifling "follow-on" development of new technologies.
This kind of strategic, or at least economically irrational, behavior eliminates the societal
benefit of full disclosure so often cited as a significant public benefit of the patent system.
See Svatos, supra note 21, at 114.
211 Svatos, supra note 21, at 117.
212 Id. at 120.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.; see 3 FRITZ MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL 176
(1984).
217 See MACHLUP, supra note 216, at 176. The consequences may be especially dire for
biotechnology startups because their limited financial resources often force them to con-
centrate on one or a few related products in the early stages of product development. As a
result, the consequences of losing the race to the PTO (or of having a drug fail during the
FDA approval process) may be more than simply wasting limited research capital. See Anne
G. Evans & Nikhil P. Varaiya, Anne Evans: Assessment of a Biotechnology Market Opportunity, 28
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY & PRAC. 87, 89 (2003) (asserting that, during the 1990's and
into early 2000 "biotech after biotech burned through their cash, experienced product
failures well into clinical development, fell out of favor with the investment community,
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tion not only encourages wasteful duplication of effort,218 but also
tends to increase research costs by imposing more time pressure on
researchers: in the race to the PTO, there is no prize for second
place.219
The complexity of the patent landscape has grown along with the
propensity to patent research tools and other increments of innova-
tion.220 Thus, when deciding whether to undertake a particular re-
search project, researchers now must spend considerable time
identifying relevant third party patents and attempting to negotiate
license agreements for the necessary technology. 22' Public and pri-
vate sector researchers have found a variety of working solutions to
minimize transaction costs associated with the potentially limited ac-
cess to intellectual property rights for biotechnology research tools.
The NIH, the courts, and the PTO have encouraged these provisional
solutions, which include defensive patenting, a "do-it-yourself' ap-
proach to obtaining proprietary tools, and informal recognition of an
"academic use" exception to infringement. 222
Companies that opt for defensive patenting decide to patent
every component of their proprietary technology. 223 This strategy
minimizes the chances of an expensive, time-consuming, acrimonious
infringement dispute because each side has a substantial patent port-
folio and thus retains some leverage in negotiations. 224 The increase
in defensive patenting may minimize patent stacking problems for the
biotechnology industry.225 The resulting patent thicket, however, will
laid off double digit percentages of their personnel, and ultimately failed as going
concerns").
218 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 208, at 871-74; Svatos, supra note 21, at 121. Ed-
mund Kitch has suggested that granting broad patents after invention but before commer-
cialization allows inventors to invest in further development without fear of preemption
and to coordinate future research with competing firms, thereby reducing duplication of
effort. See Kitch, supra note 126, at 276-77. Other economists argue that coordinated
development of new technologies is considerably less effective than competitive develop-
ment, in part because the former fails to consider strategic behavior and instead assumes
that patent holders will act rationally to maximize utility. See Merges & Nelson, supra note
208, at 872.
219 See GEOFFREY WYATT, THE ECONOMICS OF INVENTION: A STUDY OF THE DETERMINANTS
OF IN'-EN-rIvE AcrivITY 126 (1986).
220 See, e.g., Henderson et al., supra note 115, at 119-26; Walsh et al., supra note 3, at
293-96. The phrase "increments of innovation" refers to intermediate or diagnostic mole-
cules, research tools, and methods essential to conducting a course of experimentation.
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698.
221 See Walsh et al., supra note 3, at 293-96.
222 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
223 See Walsh et al., supra note 3, at 293-94.
224 See id. This is common in the new field of genomics and has been employed for
years in the Japanese electronics industry. See id. at 295, 300.
225 Empirical data suggests that few public or private sector research projects have
been discontinued for failing to negotiate access to all needed intellectual property, but
the risk remains. Id. at 298-99.
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probably continue to make public sector research more difficult and
expensive, in part because many academic researchers are unable to
pay high licensing fees for access to proprietary information or tech-
nology.2 26 Some universities have solved this problem by initiating re-
search collaborations with industry or establishing core facilities to
share expensive resources like automated sequencing and high-
throughput screening.227
Other academic researchers adopt a "do-it-yourself' approach,
making patented research tools without obtaining a license or
purchasing research tools from an unlicensed manufacturer. 228 Con-
sequently, university researchers "have a reputation for routinely ig-
noring IP rights" arising in the course of their work because many
research tools are quite easy to duplicate in the lab. 229 Despite the
CAFC's recent narrowing of the experimental use exception, 230 many
academic scientists justify infringement of research tool patents by ref-
erence to an analogous "academic use" exception. 231 Limited empiri-
cal data suggests that infringement of research tool patents also is
widespread within the biotechnology industry. 23 2 Some firms have ar-
gued that such infringement should be permitted because research
projects rarely yield commercial products. 23 3 For those that do, li-
censes may be negotiated after completion of research but before the
resulting product reaches the market.23 4 Companies have little in-
centive to license research tools because patent holders cannot easily
detect their unlicensed use.235 Even if patent holders do identify in-
fringers, the statute of limitations on claims of patent infringement
may have expired during the lengthy drug discovery process. 236
As the biotechnology industry has diversified and become eco-
nomically viable, the financial incentive provided by patents has moti-
vated many academic scientists to shift their emphasis from basic to
applied research. 237 Concomitantly, academic researchers and gradu-
226 See id. at 300-02. Licensing fees for access to genomic databases can cost tens of
millions of dollars, though some companies offer significant discounts to university re-
searchers. See id.
227 Id. at 302. Of course, in negotiating research collaboration agreements, academic
labs frequently must relinquish intellectual property rights or accept a variety of onerous
conditions, often including publication restrictions. See id.
228 See id. at 302, 324.
229 Id. at 324.
230 See infra notes 302-07 and accompanying text.
231 See Walsh et al., supra note 3, at 327.
232 Id.
233 See id. at 327-28.
234 Id. at 327 n.58.
235 Id. at 327.
236 Id. at 327-28.
237 See Svatos, supra note 21, at 122-24. Basic research is directed at answering a scien-
tific question of general interest without concern for specific applications of new technol-
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ate students in particular, may find their research options limited to
those subjects thought to have significant commercial potential.238 As
public sector scientific research becomes more commercially ori-
ented, the reallocation of research dollars from nonpatentable sub-
jects to patentable ones may guide research and development into
projects "without regard for maximizing utility," thereby generating
additional inefficiencies. 239 This change may ultimately result in a
"brain drain" of researchers leaving academic research for industrial
positions. 240 As industry demand for inventors continues to increase,
the movement of scientists from academia to industry will dilute the
training available for the next generation of researchers, with poten-
tially dire consequences for the American research enterprise. 241
Finally, the biotechnology industry must devote an ever-increas-
ing amount of its comparatively limited financial resources to patent
prosecution and infringement litigation. 242  Filing a relatively
straightforward application with the PTO typically costs $10,000 to
$15,000 in attorney, filing, issue, and maintenance fees; foreign filing
costs are often significantly more.2 43 Coverage in ten European coun-
tries, including maintenance fees over the life of the patent, routinely
costs well over $95,000.244 According to one estimate, worldwide
spending in 1992 on biotechnology patent costs exceeded $100 mil-
lion.24 5 The amount is certainly much larger today.246
ogy, whereas applied research is that directed at solving a specific problem with new
technology. CAMBRIDGE HEALTHTECH INST., RESEARCH GLOSSARY. EVOLVING TERMINOLOGY
FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, at http://www.genomicglossaries.com/content/re-
search .genomics.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
238 See Svatos, supra note 21, at 123 (quoting DOROTHY NELKIN, SCIENCE As INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY 26 (1984)).
239 Id. at 124 (citing Martha Crouch, The Very Structure of Scientific Research Mitigates
Against Developing Products to Help the Environment, the Poor, and the Hungry, 4 J. AGRIC. &
ENVTL. ETHICS 151, 154-56 (1991)). For example, biotechnology companies have geneti-
cally engineered rice so that it contains high levels of several amino acids commonly lack-
ing in the diets of chronically malnourished children in developing countries.
Unfortunately, subsistence farmers in developing countries cannot readily afford the ge-
netically engineered seed required to grow the rice. Martha Crouch suggests that our
resources might be more productively applied to improving traditional farming practices,
control of pests, and crop rotation cycles. See Crouch, supra, at 156-58.
240 Svatos, supra note 21, at 123.
241 Id. Thus, the patent system and the biotech industry "may well be slowly killing the
goose that laid the golden egg." Id.
242 Id. at 124-27; see Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 179, at 421-24. Patent prosecu-
tion is the process of patenting an invention with the PTO, beginning with the filing of a
patent application and continuing until the patent is granted or the application rejected
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, or 112.
243 See Erwin F. Berrier, Global Patent Costs Must Be Reduced, Address Before the Interna-
tional Patent Club (Sept. 12, 1995), in 36 IDEA 350, 351 (1996).
244 Id.
245 See Clive Cookson & Julie Clayton, Of Mice, Men and Money: Legal Action over Patent
Disputes Threatens to Stifle Investment in Biotechnology, FIN. TIMES, June 3, 1992, at 18.
246 See id.
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While patent fees alone may have a chilling effect on research,
litigation costs present an even more significant burden to compa-
nies.24 7 For many underfunded startups, the mere threat of patent-
related litigation is often enough to make their researchers pursue
new and different directions. 248 Consequently, one unanticipated re-
sult of the race to the patent office is that
[f]irms are often forced to take out patents of uncertain validity
and fight off challenges to them in the courts because their compet-
itors are doing the same .... However, patent battles are usually
won by the company with the greatest financial resources for legal
costs. The necessity of litigation and the uncertainty about biotech-
nology firms' ability to enforce proprietary rights has added to the
uncertainty faced by investors, making the biotechnology industry
less attractive, at least in the short run. Industry analysts expect the
patent scramble to contribute to a trend over the next few years of
great consolidation in the biotechnology industry. 249
Thus, rather than fueling innovation, the patent system has triggered
an "arms race" that has dramatically increased the costs of innovation
in biotechnology, in the form of legal fees and researchers' time spent
away from the lab talking to patent attorneys. 250 As biomedical re-
247 See Svatos, supra note 21, at 124-25. Consider the case of research groups from the
Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto and Children's Hospital in Boston, both working on
different parts of the gene responsible for causing Duchenne's muscular dystrophy. Each
group filed for a patent on its portion of the gene, but "[t]he Toronto group . . .
dropp[ed] its application because it could not afford the $20,000-plus cost of pursuing the
patent." Bernice Wuethrich, All Rights Reserved: How the Gene-Patenting Race Is Affecting Sci-
ence, 144 Sci. NEws 154, 154 (1993). The Toronto group nevertheless continued working
on the gene, only to be threatened with a lawsuit by Genica Pharmaceuticals Corp., a bio-
technology firm to which the Boston group had licensed its patent. Genica alleged that
the Toronto group's use of antibodies corresponding to patented portions of the dys-
trophin gene constituted commercial use. "The Toronto doctors had three choices: stop
their work, pay royalties, or await a lawsuit" for patent infringement. Id. Royalty stacking
costs also may strongly influence the direction of future research. See Demaine & Fellmeth,
supra note 179, at 415-19.
248 See FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS: THE BATrLE To OwN THE WORLD'S TECH-
NOLOGY 247 (1994). From 1980 to 1990, patent litigation increased by fifty-two percent. Id.
According to one author, "legal briefs outweigh scientific papers by orders of magnitude,
and lawyers are as eagerly sought as Ph.D.'s." Id. This trend will likely continue, because
biomedical patents are more likely to be litigated than patents on other technologies. See
Walsh et al., supra note 3, at 315 (citing O.J. LANJOUW & M. SCHANKERMAN, ENFORCING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTs 35 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
8656, 2001)).
249 Beverly Fleisher, Who Will Benefit from Agricultural Biotechnology: An Analysis of Eco-
nomic and Legal Influences, in BIOTECHNOLOGY'. ASSESSING SOCIAL IMPACTS AND POLICY IMPLI-
CATIONS 101, 104-05 (DavidJ. Webber ed., 1990).
250 See Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Innovation and the United States Patent System Today, Paper
presented to the Antitrust and Patent Sections of the American Bar Association Meeting
5-6 (Oct. 19, 1992), reprinted inWARSHOFSKY, supra note 248, at 246. Moreover, as with the
bursting of the "dot-com" bubble, an industry-wide wave of consolidation and reorganiza-
tion may have a significant economic impact outside the industry. See, e.g., Anatole Kalet-
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search continues to move "from a commons model toward a privatiza-
tion model, '251 these costs will hamper the progress of research and
development, and eventually will be passed to consumers in the form
of higher prices and diminished access to biotechnology products.
25 2
C. Patenting Biotechnology Research Tools May Deter
Innovation
The rapid proliferation of patents covering biotechnological in-
ventions may ultimately impede rather than accelerate scientific pro-
gress and downstream innovation.253 The PTO's issuance of broad
patents covering basic research methods and reagents254 has allowed
patent holders to slow the progress of public and private research by
charging prohibitively high licensing fees, subjecting would-be users
of licensed materials to onerous restrictions, or simply refusing to li-
cense their patents at all.255
Concerns that the tendency to patent each new discovery would
drive up research costs and impede scientific progress motivated a
1992-93 revolt led by several academic scientists which the NIH
joined several years later.256 The conflict initially centered upon the
policies of GenPharm, a company that supplied researchers with a
strain of transgenic mice that lacked a tumor suppressor protein
called p5 3 .2 5 7 GenPharm charged researchers between $80 and $150
per mouse and forbade purchasers to breed the animals.258 In re-
sponse, some 300 disgruntled researchers attended a meeting held
sky, What Happened to the Day of Reckoning?, TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 2, 2003, at 24, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,630-800787,00.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
251 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698.
252 Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 179, at 416.
253 See, e.g., id. at 415-21 (discussing the costs of patent stacking as well as conflicting
and blocking patents); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698-99 (discussing the grad-
ual shift of biotechnology research "from a commons model toward a privatization
model"); Marshall, supra note 26, at 256-57 (describing a revolt led by the NIH then-
Director in which academic scientists who were using a proprietary technology controlled
by the DuPont Corporation to create transgenic mice strains refused to solicit the com-
pany's approval before sharing the technology among themselves); Merges & Nelson, supra
note 208, at 904-08 (discussing the impact of broad patents that cover pioneering technol-
ogy on future innovation in science-based industries).
254 These include patents not only for methods of producing monoclonal antibodies
and expressing recombinant proteins in bacteria but also for an array of single nucleotide
polymorphisms and cDNAs. See Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 179, at 415-16.
255 See id. at 414; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698-99.
256 Marshall, supra note 26, at 256.
257 Id. The p53 protein helps regulate the progression of cell division. Mutations in
the p53 gene have been implicated in a wide variety of human cancers. See David G. Kirsch
& Michael B. Kastan, Tumor-Suppressor p53: Implications for Tumor Development and Prognosis,
16 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGy 3158 (1998). This mouse strain was thus extremely useful in
studies of the process by which a normal cell is transformed into a cancer cell. See id. at
3165.
258 See Marshall, supra note 26, at 256.
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during a scientific conference at the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
in 1992 and suggested that the National Academy of Sciences "re-
view . . . restrictions on the sharing of research tools." 2 59 The NIH
then funded the creation of a repository of genetically altered mice
strains, in order to provide all researchers with equal access to trans-
genic mice. 260
The repository temporarily solved the access problem, but the
staff had difficulty keeping track of and complying with the conditions
for use of the deposited strains.261 In the mid-1990s, the lab stopped
accepting mice created with a proprietary gene-insertion method
called Cre-loxP, which enables a researcher to select particular condi-
tions under which expression of a transgene may be induced or re-
pressed.2 62  The DuPont Pharmaceutical Company ("DuPont")
licensed the patent covering the Cre-loxP technology from Harvard
University in 1990 and promptly demanded that scientists using trans-
genic mice created with that method not share the technology among
themselves without the company's prior approval.263 DuPont later
asked scientists who had published data obtained with Cre-loxP mice
to sign an agreement allowing company officials to review any future
scientific journal articles before publication. 264 Finally, the company
sought to obtain "reach-through" rights to downstream inventions
arising from the use of transgenic animals created by the Cre-loxP
method.2 65 A concerned group of scientists-led by Nobel Prize win-
ner and NIH director Harold Varmus-revolted once again.2 66 On
behalf of the NIH, Varmus refused to sign an agreement covering use
of Cre-loxP mice, inconveniencing thousands of research staff and,
259 Id.; see also WORKSHOP SUMMARY, supra note 3, at vii (summarizing a workshop held
at the National Academy of Sciences in February 1996 that built on the findings of an
earlier meeting about "how the scientific community should respond to various constraints
on the use of research tools and, in particular, to the terms set by Human Genome Sci-
ences for access to its private EST database").
260 The Induced Mutant Resource is located at The Jackson Laboratory in Bar Harbor,
Maine. See Marshall, supra note 26, at 256; The Induced Mutant Resource, at http://
www.jax.org/imr/index.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
261 See Marshall, supra note 26, at 257.
262 A transgene is a foreign gene used to transform a mouse (or other animal) to make
a transgenic strain. It is generally a gene from another organism implicated in the etiology
or progression of a particular disease of interest, expression of which causes the animal to
contract the disease. See SINGER & BERG, supra note 141, at 890-92.
263 Researchers were allowed to exchange neither transgenic strains nor the technol-
ogy to engineer them. See Marshall, supra note 26, at 257.
264 Id.
265 Id. Though "reach-through" rights and royalties are often regarded as abuse of the
leverage granted by a patent monopoly, granting such rights does not necessarily consti-
tute patent misuse. Nor is the grant of "reach-through" royalties inherently bad, provided
the parties involved are of equal bargaining power and negotiate at arm's length. See Ma-
rina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9
CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL' 193, 207 (1999).
266 See Marshall, supra note 26, at 257.
2004] 1029
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
perhaps more importantly, publicly embarrassing DuPont officials. 267
He told DuPont that its restrictive terms "could seriously impede fur-
ther basic research and thwart the development of future technolo-
gies that will benefit the public."268 After intensive negotiations,
DuPont stopped demanding pre-publication review of research, re-
laxed its animal sharing policies, and stopped pursuing its reach-
through claims. 269
Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg have argued that the
proliferation of patents covering upstream technology is creating an
"anticommons" in biotechnology research. 270 "Responding to a shift
in U.S. government policy" since 1980, the NIH and major public re-
search universities "have created technology transfer offices to patent
and license their discoveries." 271 In addition, a growing number of
commercial biotechnology firms increasingly rely on licensing reve-
nues from their patent portfolios to finance their research. 272 Conse-
quently, upstream biomedical research "is increasingly likely to be
private," whether "supported by private funds, carried out in a private
institution, or privately appropriated through patents, trade secrecy,
or [licensing] agreements that restrict the use of materials and
data."273 While the patent system does occasionally induce research-
ers to undertake risky research projects, the proliferation of patents
on ever smaller increments of innovation has produced "a spiral of
overlapping patent claims in the hands of different owners, reaching
ever further upstream." 274 Therefore, a "tragedy of the anticommons"
may arise when a researcher requires access to several patented mater-
ials in order to conduct a single experiment.27 5 As Heller and Eisen-
berg note, "[e] ach upstream patent allows its owner to set up another
267 Id.
268 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
269 Id.; see Eliot Marshall, NIH, DuPont Declare Truce in Mouse War, 281 Sci. 1261,
1261-62 (1998). DuPont eventually agreed to let NIH scientists and all other federally
funded researchers at nonprofit institutions exchange animals without directly obtaining
DuPont's approval, though the company did retain commercial fights to the technology.
See Eliot Marshall, NIH Cuts Deal on Use of OncoMouse, 287 Scl. 567, 567 (2000).
270 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698. "Anticommons" property refers to a
"mirror image of [the] commons property," first described by Garrett Hardin in 1968. Id.;
see Hardin, supra note 14, at 1244. According to the anticommons theory, "a resource is
prone to underuse . .. when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from
[using] a scarce resource." Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698.
271 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698; see Eisenberg, Government-Sponsored Re-
search, supra note 17, at 1691-92; Mowery et al., supra note 102, at 100.
272 See GRUBB, supra note 198, at 373-76 (discussing royalty income from patents);
MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 255-56 (1986).
273 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698 (internal quotation marks omitted).
274 Id.
275 Id. at 698-99.
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tollbooth on the road to product development, adding to the cost and
slowing the pace of downstream . .. innovation. '" 27 6
IV
ALLEVIATING THE IMPACT OF STRONG PATENT PROTECTION
ON FUTURE INNOVATION
Proponents of the patent system generally assume that the mar-
ket will induce patent holders to act rationally in their economic inter-
est. Accordingly, they should attempt to maximize economic utility by
licensing their inventions to others working in the same field and con-
tinuing to improve their technology.2 7 7 With increasing frequency,
however, patent holders refuse to license their inventions, license
them subject to burdensome restrictions, or use their patents to lever-
age their way into secondary markets. This decreases or eliminates
the putative economic benefits of the patent system. 2 7 8 Faced with
mounting evidence that the continued privatization of scientific
knowledge will produce additional market failures, 279 increase re-
search costs, and inhibit technological progress, several commentators
have proposed ways to address the problem by modifying the existing
patent system. 28 0 This Part first discusses several possible modifica-
tions of the Patent Act. It then reviews the origin and application of
the common law experimental use exception. Finally, it argues that
implementing a reformulated and broadly applied experimental use
276 Id.
277 See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REv. 1177, 1179 (2000).
278 See id.
279 Recall the prolonged battle between DuPont and the NIH regarding the use of
transgenic mice created with DuPont's proprietary Cre-loxP technology. See supra notes
261-269 and accompanying text.
280 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experi-
mental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1078 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Progress of Science]
(recommending "an experimental use exemption from patent infringement liability" to
verify the accuracy of a specification or the validity of patent claims, but not for "[r] esearch
use of a patented invention with a primary ... market among research users," and sug-
gesting that when exempt experimental use leads to significant improvement in the pat-
ented technology, the patent holder "might be . . . award[ed] a reasonable royalty");
Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United
States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption,
76 N.Y.U. L. Rrv. 1623, 1679, 1684 (2001) (suggesting a compulsory licensing regime for
gene patents in return for a royalty keyed to the financial success of the product developed
by the licensee and proposing an experimental use exemption for government and non-
profit researchers); Leibovitz, supra note 207, at 2268 (proposing a nonexclusive "patent
system that, instead of granting exclusive property rights to the first inventor of a new
technology, protects him from free-riding competitors, but not against competitors who
independently develop the same technology"); O'Rourke, supra note 277, at 1180-81 (ar-
guing that patent law should implement a fair use defense to infringement in order to
address increasingly common instances of market failure in technology-based industries).
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exception to patent infringement will most effectively remedy the ef-
fects of privatizing scientific knowledge.
A. Nonexclusive Patents, Compulsory Licensing, or Fair Use?
John Leibovitz suggested the adoption of a system of nonexclu-
sive patent protection. 281 According to this proposal, a patent grant
would protect the inventor from free-riding competitors, but not from
other inventors who independently develop the same technology. 2 2
Thus, the first person to invent a new technology would not necessa-
rily obtain exclusive property rights in it.283 A nonexclusive patent
grant would allow rivals to compete with the original inventor "based
on legitimate investments in research and development" and an objec-
tive assessment of the costs and benefits of each research project,
rather than on the possibility of winning or losing a technological
monopoly.2 8 4
Other scholars have suggested either a compulsory licensing re-
gime or an experimental use defense to patent infringement. 285
Donna Gitter proposed a two-part reform. First, a compulsory licens-
ing regime would require holders of patents for DNA sequences to
license their inventions to commercial researchers in return for a vari-
able royalty payment based on the financial success of any products
the licensees develop. 28 6 Second, an experimental use exception from
compulsory licensing would allow government and nonprofit re-
searchers to use the inventions free of charge. 28 7 While Professor Git-
ter's approach would enable researchers to access patented DNA
sequences, opponents of issuing gene patents continue to argue that
individuals or companies should not be allowed to control access to
281 See Leibovitz, supra note 207, at 2268.
282 Id. According to Leibovitz, agreeing that "the law must protect inventors so they
can appropriate returns from their inventions ... does not necessarily imply that only the
first inventor should be able to appropriate those returns." Id.
283 See id.
284 Id. at 2269. Leibovitz argues that a nonexclusive patent system would also "reduce
the possibility of anticompetitive behavior" during downstream technological development
because when "the monopoly threat is high"-as with pioneering inventions for which
substitutes are not readily available-"inventors would face potential competition from"
other inventors attempting to develop the same technology. Id. Thus, the incentive driv-
ing the competition would depend on the potential profits derived from the invention. See
id. Despite the theoretical appeal of this approach, it would require a radical reformula-
tion of our current system of intellectual property protection, and so may be most useful as
a starting point for discussion.
285 See, e.g., Eisenberg, Progress of Science, supra note 280, at 1078 (suggesting an experi-
mental use exception); Gitter, supra note 280, at 1679 (recommending a compulsory li-
censing system); O'Rourke, supra note 277, at 1180 (proposing a fair use defense).
286 Gitter, supra note 280, at 1679-84.
287 Id. at 1679, 1684-90.
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our genetic information because the human genome embodies the
collective heritage of the human race.
288
Maureen O'Rourke described a fair use doctrine modeled on
provisions of American copyright law. 28 9 Determining what consti-
tutes fair use of a patented invention would require evaluation of five
factors:
(i) the nature of the advance represented by the infringement;
(ii) the purpose of the infringing use;
(iii) the nature and strength of the market failure that prevents a
license from being concluded;
(iv) the impact of the use on the patentee's incentives and overall
social welfare; and
(v) the nature of the patented work. 290
O'Rourke further argued that a fair use doctrine must be formally
adopted 29 1 because current patent law doctrines provide an incentive
to license for patent holders who might otherwise refuse292 but do not
288 See, e.g., David Ewing Duncan, Tracking Genes in Iceland: Sifting Viking Records Yields a
Marker for Stroke, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 2003, at I1, available at http://ginasmith.typepad.
com/biotechnews -digest_/2003/10/trackinggenes_.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2004)
(mentioning the importance of privacy issues in the context of genetic screening and the
creation of a genetic database in Iceland); Catherine Goldwater, Iceland Exploits Its Genetic
History (BBC television broadcast, Feb. 4, 2000), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
science/nature/630961.stm (last visited Feb. 5, 2004) (discussing the controversy sur-
rounding scientists' attempt to create a genetic database of Iceland's citizens, due to the
implication of privacy issues and the possible adverse use of the information by drug
companies).
289 See O'Rourke, supra note 277, at 1198-1211. The analogy between permissible use
of patented inventions and fair use in copyright law is gaining some prominent supporters,
most notably Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit. See Integra Lifescis. I, Ltd. v. Merck
KgaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). When the CAFC was asked to determine the scope of the safe harbor provision of
the Hatch-Waxman Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e) (1) (2000), a statutory exemption from infringe-
ment for uses "reasonably related" to securing regulatory approval for generic drugs-
Judge Newman argued that the "[s]tudy of patented information is essential to the crea-
tion of new knowledge, thereby achieving further scientific and technological progress."
Integra, 331 F.3d at 864-65, 876 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In her view, although the safe harbor provision does not "reach back down the chain of
experimentation to embrace development and identification of new drugs," the fact that
research is conducted with the goal of commercialization should not automatically elimi-
nate the exception. Id. at 877 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
290 O'Rourke, supra note 277, at 1205.
291 See id. at 1198-1211.
292 Id. at 1198. In particular, O'Rourke is concerned with the reverse doctrine of
equivalents and the doctrine of blocking patents. See id. at 1193-94. The doctrine of
equivalents allows a court to interpret the scope of a patent's claims expansively to find
infringement even when the accused infringing device does not read directly onto the
patented claims. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29-30
(1997). The reverse doctrine of equivalents excuses an infringement when the infringer
has radically improved a device to the point that it "is so far changed in principle from a
patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different
way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim." Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950). The doctrine of blocking patents refers
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permit infringement that is socially beneficial. 293
Finally, Rebecca Eisenberg recommended allowing the experi-
mental "use of a patented invention to check the adequacy of the [pat-
ent] specification and the validity of the patent holder's claims about
the invention." 294 Eisenberg maintains that a patent holder should
not be permitted "to enjoin the use of a patented invention in subse-
quent research in the field of the invention, which could potentially
lead to improvements in the patented technology or to the develop-
ment of alternative means of achieving the same purpose."295 Despite
her willingness to permit some infringing uses, Eisenberg opposes ex-
emption from infringement liability for experimental use of a pat-
ented invention that is useful only to other researchers "when the
research user is an ordinary consumer of the patented invention."296
B. The Common Law Experimental Use Exception
The common law has recognized a narrow experimental use ex-
ception to patent infringement since the nineteenth century. Justice
Story first articulated the defense in Whittemore v. Cutter,297 arguing in
dicta that the legislature could not have intended to punish a man
who built "a [patented] machine merely for philosophical experi-
ments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the ma-
chine to produce its described effects." 298 Later that year, Justice
Story revisited the notion in Sawin v. Guild, distinguishing "the mak-
ing with an intent to use for profit" (an infringing use) from making
"for the mere purpose of [scientific] experiment, or to ascertain the
verity and exactness of the specification" (a noninfringing use).299 To
support a charge of infringement, he continued, "the making [of a
to a situation in which one inventor patents an improvement on a previously patented
invention. The improver infringes the earlier patent, but the original patentee has no
rights to the patented improvement. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REv. 989, 1009-1010 (1997). By giving the infringer
some bargaining power in licensing negotiations, the doctrine of blocking patents may
help overcome market defects like strategic behavior during negotiations and high transac-
tion costs. See id. at 1065.
293 See O'Rourke, supra note 277, at 1196-98. According to O'Rourke, socially desira-
ble types of infringement include those committed in order to verify that a patented inven-
tion functions as claimed and those committed during the course of not-for-profit research
or teaching. See id.
294 Eisenberg, Progress of Science, supra note 280, at 1078.
295 Id. Eisenberg acknowledges that "it might be appropriate in some cases to award a
reasonable royalty after the fact to be sure that the patent holder receives an adequate
return on the initial investment in" research and development. Id.
296 Id.
297 See 29 F.Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (Story, J., sitting as Circuit Judge).
298 Id. at 1121.
299 21 F. Cas 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
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patented device] must be [done] with an intent to infringe the patent-
right, and deprive the owner of the lawful rewards of his discovery." 30 0
Later cases established the boundaries of the exception,0 l which
resulted in a strictly construed exemption for experiments conducted
"for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry. °30 2 Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. further re-
stricted the reach of the experimental use exception by characterizing
it as "truly narrow," such that it did not extend to the use of a pat-
ented invention "in keeping with the legitimate business of' an al-
leged infringer.303  In the court's view, "argument[s] that the
experimental use rule deserve [d] a broad construction [were] notjus-
tified. °304 Any infringing activity with "definite, cognizable, and . ..
[ ]substantial commercial purposes"-however "experimental"-fell
short of the experimental use exception.3 05 Several years later, the
court in Deuterium Corp. v. United States applied a "purpose test" to de-
termine whether the defendant's actions fell within the exception.30 6
Under that test, the experimental use exception applies if "the ac-
cused devices [are] used for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
philosophical inquiry[,] '30 7 but not if a use is "in keeping with the
legitimate business of the using agency" or "has [a] definite, cogniza-
ble, and not insubstantial commercial purpose[ ]."308
300 Id.
301 See Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) ("[The allegedly
infringing device] can be eliminated from consideration [under the experimental use ex-
ception] for it affirmatively appeared, without contradiction by plaintiff, that defendant
built that device only experimentally and that it has neither manufactured it for sale nor
sold any."); Ruth v. Steams-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697, 713 (D. Colo. 1935), rev'd on
other grounds, 87 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1935) ("The making or using of a patented invention
merely for experimental purposes, without any intent to derive profits or practical advan-
tage therefrom, is not infringement." (citation omitted)); Bonsack Mach. Co. v. Under-
wood, 73 F. 206, 211 (C.C. E.D.N.C. 1896) ("It is true that ... [a] machine . . . made or
used [only] as an experiment . . .do[es] not ... constitute an infringement.").
302 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (address-
ing the scope of the experimental use exception in the context of infringing experimenta-
tion by a generic drug manufacturer). In response to the Federal Circuit's decision in
Roche, Congress later passed legislation implementing a broad experimental use exemption
solely applicable to the generic drug industry. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000).
303 Roche, 733 F.2d at 863 (quoting Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1125-26
(Ct. Cl. 1976)).
304 Id.
305 Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (allowing uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information related to the seeking of FDA approval for generic drugs).
306 Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 624, 631 (1990) (describing the test in
Douglas v. United States, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170, 177 (Ct. Cl. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 364
(1975)).
307 Douglas, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 177.
308 Roche, 733 F.2d at 863.
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Deuterium Corp.'s extremely narrow experimental use exception
survives to this day, though perhaps not for much longer.30 9 Judge
Rader of the CAFC would eliminate the exception3 10 because "the Pat-
ent Act leaves no room for any de minimis or experimental use excuses
for infringement. '" 311 In cases of minimal or wholly noncommercial
infringement, "the damage computation process... [allows] courts to
preclude large (or perhaps any) awards for minimal infringements,"
making the exception unnecessary.312 Moreover, Judge Rader argues
that continued recognition of the exception effectively destroys the
value of research tool patents, 313 even though it was intended to allow
only minimal encroachment on the rights of patentees in pursuit of
FDA approval.314 Because "patented [research] tools often facilitate
general research to identify candidate drugs, as well as downstream
safety-related experiments on those new drugs," all research tools
used at any stage of drug development could potentially be used with-
out fear of infringement under the safe harbor provision. 31 5 Such an
outcome would contravene the purpose of § 271 (e), which was in-
tended "to reverse the effects of Roche under limited circumstances,
not to deprive entire categories of inventions of patent protection. '" 31 6
C. Expanding the Experimental Use Exception and Subjecting
Essential Research Tools to Compulsory Licensing Will
Ameliorate the Problems Associated with Patent Stacking
Many of the anticommons effects of patenting biotechnology re-
search tools may be mitigated within the existing framework of patent
law. This Note proposes a three-pronged approach to the problem.
1. The Experimental Use Exception Should Apply to Public Sector
Researchers
An expansive experimental use exception for public sector re-
searchers would eliminate research bottlenecks and decrease transac-
309 See Integra Lifescis. I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Ra-
der, J.) (narrowly construing § 271(e)(1) "to reverse the effects of Roche under limited
circumstances, not to deprive entire categories of inventions of patent protection").
310 See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader,
J., concurring).
311 Id. (RaderJ., concurring).
312 Id.
313 Integra, 331 F.3d at 867. In trying to solve the problem of access to proprietary
research tools, academic researchers and the biotechnology industry have often caused the
precise problems that judge Rader anticipated from 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) and a
broad experimental use exception. See supra notes 220-241 and accompanying text.
314 See Integra, 331 F.3d at 867.
315 Id.
316 Id. Similar reasoning explains Eisenberg's formulation of an experimental use ex-
ception, which excludes researchers who are "ordinary consumer[s]" of patented research
tools. Eisenberg, Progress of Science, supra note 280, at 1078.
1036 [Vol. 89:993
A MODEST PROPOSAL
tion costs resulting from patent stacking. The exception would cover
noncommercial use of any biological material, reagent, or research
tool for which an equivalent substitute is not readily available.
The American patent system is designed to accomplish two goals:
(1) to provide financial incentive to create new scientific knowledge
and develop new products from that knowledge to benefit the public,
and (2) to increase the body of published scientific and technical
knowledge.31 7 Requiring patent holders to disclose the details of pat-
ented inventions facilitates greater understanding of a patent holder's
technological advance and, in turn, improvement upon that technol-
ogy. To achieve the aims of the Constitution's Intellectual Property
Clause, however, "[t]he right to conduct research to achieve such
knowledge need not, and should not, await expiration of the pat-
ent. "'3 1 Nor should it depend on a patent holder's willingness to li-
cense proprietary technology. Despite the importance of research
and development in today's technology-based economy, courts con-
tinue to narrow the already limited common law research exemp-
tion.319 Yet continued recognition of an experimental use exception
to the patent grant is essential to facilitate ongoing technological
innovation. 320
Proscribing all research into patented subject matter unless the
patent holder gives permission-the route apparently mandated by
Integra v. Merck-would seriously impede technological progress. In-
formation disclosed in patents is a major source of scientific knowl-
edge and is seldom published elsewhere. An expansive experimental
use exception would allow the study of patented subject matter "in
order to understand it, or to improve upon it, or to find a new use for
it, or to modify or 'design around' it."321 Without such an exception,
technological innovation would slow significantly or stop entirely be-
cause the holder of a pioneering patent in a particular field of re-
search "could bar not only patent-protected competition, but all
research that might lead to such competition, as well as . . . [the]
improvement or challenge or avoidance of patented technology. "322
Much of modem technology builds upon knowledge gleaned from
disclosure of previously patented inventions. Therefore, a blanket
317 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
318 Integra, 331 F.3d at 873 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
319 See id. at 872 (suggesting that the court had "essentially eliminate[d] the common
law research exemption").
320 See id. (remarking that the court's holding "is ill-suited to today's research-founded,
technology-based economy").
321 Id. at 875 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
322 Id.
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prohibition of research that probes this knowledge undermines the
purposes of American patent law. 323
In exchange for "the right to exclude others from making, us-
ing, . or selling the [claimed] invention,' 324 the Patent Act requires
the patent holder to make a full and detailed disclosure of his inven-
tion. 325 The disclosure must include descriptions of enabling experi-
ments, the best mode of implementation, preferred embodiments of
the invention, schematic drawings, and other essential technical de-
tails.326 Such comprehensive disclosure would be unnecessary and ir-
relevant if the information could not be used for twenty years.
Similarly, the requirement that patent applications be published
within one year of filing "would be [of] little value.., if the informa-
tion [was] then placed on ice and protected from further study and
research investigation" for twenty years.327 Instead, "the patent system
both contemplates and facilitates research into patented subject mat-
ter, whether the purpose is scientific understanding, evaluation, com-
parison, or improvement," because such activities are essential to
technological progress. 328
The Patent Act does not require a patent holder to use his inven-
tion, but only to disclose and describe it in sufficiently enabling detail
that it can be reproduced without undue experimentation. 329 Re-
searchers should not be required to obtain a patent holder's permis-
sion whenever a patented device is made, modified, or otherwise
investigated. Study of patented information is crucial to scientific and
technological progress. An expansive experimental use exception
would permit the use of patented information in research and devel-
opment while preserving the patent holder's incentive to innovate.
Although an effective patent law must first consider the rights of the
inventor, who may freely profit from his invention or enjoin any com-
mercial or precommercial application, the patent grant does not ex-
pressly forbid research that precedes such applications. 33 0
323 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
324 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
325 See id. § 112.
326 See Integra, 331 F.3d at 875 (Newman,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 According to the CAFC, a specification satisfies the written description require-
ment of § 112 if it enables "a person skilled in the art to make the [material] .. . needed to
practice the claimed invention without undue experimentation." In re Wands, 858 F.2d
731, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
330 See Integra, 331 F.3d at 875-76 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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An expansive experimental use exception should, however, apply
only to public sector researchers.331 This would permit noncommer-
cial use of any biological material, reagent, or research tool for which
an equivalent substitute is not readily available.3 32 For cases in which
it is difficult to distinguish commercial use of patented technology
from noncommercial use, courts should be guided by the words of
Judge Newman, who noted "that there is a generally recognized dis-
tinction between 'research' and [product] 'development,' as a matter
of scale, creativity, resource allocation, and ... the level of scientific
[or] engineering skill needed for the project."333
2. A Collective Rights Organization Should Administer a Compulsory
Licensing Regime
Subjecting essential reagents and research tools used in commer-
cial research to a compulsory licensing regime would eliminate much
anticompetitive behavior in the biotechnology industry. Whereas the
experimental use exception would cover noncommercial use of pat-
ented methods, reagents, and research tools, a collective rights organi-
zation (CRO)3 3 4 would negotiate licenses for the use of proprietary
technologies in commercial research. CROs include both patent
pools and collective copyright licensing organizations, such as the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP)
and Broadcast Music Inc. (BMI).335 Unlike traditional compulsory li-
censing schemes, in which uniform licensing rates are set by statute,
331 "Public sector" researchers work for a university, state or federal government, or
other nonprofit organization whose primary mission is research or teaching and not the
commercial development of biotechnology research tools or pharmaceuticals. See BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1246 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "public sector" as "[t]he part of the econ-
omy or an industry that is controlled by the government"); see also id. at 1214 (defining
"private sector" as "[t]he part of the economy or an industry that is free from direct gov-
ernmental control").
332 Extending the experimental use exception from DNA sequences to every irreplace-
able or unique biological material, reagent, or research tool will best serve the constitution-
ally mandated goal of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This approach also acknowledges that research materials other than DNA
sequence information may be essential to scientific progress.
333 Integra, 331 F.3d at 876 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Newman and other commentators have analogized experimental use to fair use in
copyright law. See id. at 876 n.9 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
O'Rourke, supra note 277, at 1205 n.118. In both, although the question of whether a
particular use comes within the experimental use exception arises in myriad situations, it is
generally clear whether the exception applies. See Integra, 331 F.3d at 876 (Newman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
334 Collective rights organizations are private agreements established "to break the
transactional bottleneck" interfering with exploitation of intellectual property rights. Rob-
ert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293, 1295-96 (1996).
335 See id. at 1295 (noting that two advantages of CROs are "expert tailoring and re-
duced political economy problems").
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"knowledgeable industry participants set the rules of exchange" for a
CRO.336 These rules vary according to the broad features of the rights
being transferred. 337 Licensing terms for specific intellectual property
rights derive from members' knowledge of and experience with the
given technology. 3 38 Consequently, the contracts "reflect[ ] not only
collective industry expertise but also the need for efficiency in carry-
ing out a high volume of transactions." 339 In addition, private CROs
can adjust their rates to accommodate market fluctuations more easily
than statutory compulsory licensing schemes can be amended. 340
In order to balance the competing demands of commercial and
noncommercial researchers with the public good, the CRO should
contain representatives from public sector academic research institu-
tions, the NIH, the National Science Foundation, and the Biotechnol-
ogy Industry Organization. 341 This CRO would then assess the
development costs and commercial potential of new methods, re-
agents, and research tools and set licensing fees accordingly. For
broadly applicable technologies, the licensing regime could be
modeled upon the approach taken by the University of California and
Stanford University in licensing the Cohen-Boyer patents, which cov-
ered basic recombinant DNA technology. 342 Instead of granting the
patent holder prohibitive reach-through 343 royalties based on the
commercial success of any resulting products, these universities recog-
nized the broad applications of their discovery, licensed the technol-
ogy widely and nonexclusively to public sector researchers, and
assessed only minimal reach-through royalties if a product made it to
the market. Institutional users paid a nominal annual fee for a license
covering every researcher at a particular campus or research facil-
336 Id.
337 Id. at 1295-96.
338 Id. at 1296.
339 Id.
340 See id. at 1295-96.
341 The National Science Foundation dispenses research funding in the form of peer-
reviewed grants, as does the NIH. Members of the Biotechnology Industry Organization
include biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies as well as law firms practicing intel-
lectual property law. See http://www.2.bio.org/members/members.asp (last visited Feb.
12, 2004). Such a roster of members would ensure that both public and private interests
were equally represented on the CRO.
342 See WORKSHOP SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 40-42. The Cohen-Boyer technology,
which covered three separate patents, was licensed on an annual basis for a flat fee of
$10,000 plus a royalty on sales of any product made with the proprietary method (starting
at 1% of the first $5 million in sales and decreasing to 0.5% of sales over $10 million). See
HACKING, supra note 25, at 45-46. The license extended to every researcher working for
the licensee. Id.
343 A "reach-through" royalty is typically negotiated as part of a license agreement: a
licensee agrees to pay royalties on sales of future products developed with the licensed
technology. SeeJames Gregory Cullem, Panning for Biotechnology Gold: Reach-Through Royalty
Damage Awards for Infringing Uses of Patented Molecular Sieves, 39 IDEA 553, 561-62 (1999).
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ity.344 This approach was extremely successful: in terms of licensing
revenue, the Cohen-Boyer patents are the most lucrative ever pro-
duced by university research,345 and their pioneering technology was
successfully transferred to the commercial sector without hindering
the progress of basic research. 346 For technologies with more limited
research applications, the terms of the license agreement could in-
clude a higher fee or, in extreme cases, even reach-through royalties.
3. Biotechnology Patents Should Have Limited Scope
Finally, narrow application of the enablement and written
description requirements to biotechnological inventions would limit
the scope of issued patents. This would reduce conflict between pat-
ent holders who control proprietary technologies and researchers
who use or improve upon those technologies.
According to 35 U.S.C. § 112, the disclosure included in a patent
application must be sufficient "to enable any person skilled in the
art . . . to make and use" all the embodiments of the invention
claimed in the patent.3 47 This requirement is often applied rather
loosely during patent prosecution: sometimes an application "that de-
scribes only one working example of an invention but that supplies
less guidance on the subject matter at the fringes of [the] claims" will
suffice. 348 While intuitively it makes sense to limit the rights of patent
holders to those embodiments enabled in the specification, such lit-
eral application of § 112 would encourage competitors to patent mi-
nor modifications of the original invention and would render patent
344 This Note recognizes that the Cohen-Boyer technology was anomalous because it
was inexpensive, of critical importance to the development of modern biotechnology, and
no ready substitute was available, so there was little resistance to its widespread licensing.
In fact, the terms of the licensing agreement were such that they "encouraged firms" to
license rather than challenge the validity of the patents. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisen-
berg, The Public and the Private in Biopharmaceutical Research, CONF. ON THE PUB. DOMAIN
(2001), at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/raieisen.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
While not every patented research tool will be as essential or as widely used, intellectual
property rights must nevertheless be distributed so as to avoid impeding scientific research.
345 See Mowery et al., supra note 102, at 110.
346 See id. at 110-14. Failure to preempt the anticommons problem in biotechnology
patents will leave it in the hands of Congress. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L.
REv. 99, 156-58 (2000). So far, Congress has displayed a willingness to create novel statu-
tory exceptions to the exclusive patent holder's right that are effectively "compulsory li-
cense[s] at... a royalty of zero." Id. at 158. For example, generic drug manufacturers are
permitted to use a patented drug to obtain any information required to secure FDA ap-
proval before expiration of the original patent term. Id. at 156-57 & n.331 (citing 35
U.S.C. § 271(e) (1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). In addition, healthcare professionals are
allowed to use patented medical procedures without authorization if necessary. Id. at 159
& n.343 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (Supp. IV 1998)).
347 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
348 Merges & Nelson, supra note 208, at 845.
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protection practically worthless. 349 In practice, a patent's specifica-
tion "need not point out precisely how to make every device" that falls
within its claims; rather, it should disclose an "inventive concept or
principle whose precise contours are defined by the claims. 35°
On the other hand, it is equally possible to extend the require-
ments of § 112 too far. Although an inventor certainly should be able
to claim embodiments beyond his precise disclosure, the PTO cur-
rently "seems to permit a range of claims that may stretch beyond the
spirit of the enablement doctrine. '351 A narrow reading of § 112
would permit an application including relatively narrow claims in
which the specification "provide[d] only a starting point, a direction
for further research, ' 352 but would allow the PTO and courts to reject
an identical application with extremely broad claims. Because bio-
technology remains an unpredictable science, "an enabling descrip-
tion ... must provide those skilled in the art with a specific and useful
teaching. ' 353 At the same time, a narrow application of § 112 would
allow the PTO and the CAFC to issue patents of narrower scope.
CONCLUSION
Passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 capped a sea change in
American technology policy. When the federal government allowed
researchers to retain patent rights to any inventions conceived and
reduced to practice with the aid of federal funding, the lure of poten-
tially massive revenues-whether from licensing research tools or sales
of a blockbuster drug-caused a race to the PTO. The resulting in-
crease in the number of patent applications filed and patents granted
has played a crucial role in the development of the biotechnology in-
dustry. With this increase, however, has come the gradual realization
that something must be done to reverse the "creeping propertiza-
tion"3 54 of science before downstream innovation is irrevocably
diminished.
This Note has argued that implementing a broad experimental
use exemption from patent infringement for noncommercial research
would ameliorate problems caused by the increasing propensity to
349 See id.
350 Id. at 846; see also Gillette Safety Razor Co. v. Clark Blade & Razor Co., 187 F. 149,
149 (C.C.D.N.J. 1911), affd, 194 F. 421 (3d Cir. 1912) (upholding a patent for the first
disposable blade safety razor despite the fact that it did not sufficiently describe all possible
embodiments of the blade).
351 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 208, at 848; Walsh et al., supra note 3, at 297.
352 Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
353 Id. at 1367-68.
354 Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Re-
search, in ScIErcIC INNOVATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 147 (Ellen Frankel Paul
et al. eds., 1996) (emphasis omitted).
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patent biotechnology research tools. In addition, forming a CRO to
license proprietary methods, reagents, and research tools for commer-
cial use will accommodate the conflicting interests of public- and pri-
vate-sector researchers. Finally, restricting the scope of biotechnology
patents will reduce conflicts and increased transaction costs that result
from patent stacking. Together, these changes will alleviate the ineffi-
ciencies and market failures resulting from the unchecked prolifera-
tion of biotechnology patents, and enable the American research
enterprise to continue driving technological change well into the
future.
